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Can a country achieve its development goals or, at least, its economic growth goals when it faces forty years of war? Angola's case serves as a paradigmatic example to answer this question. From 1961 to 1974, Angolans opposed Portuguese colonial rule by violent, revolutionary struggle. But from 1975 (Angola's independence year) to April 2002 (the date of the last cease-fire), a civil war pitted the ruling MPLA party against the main rebel group, UNITA. Macroeconomic performance differed across these two time-periods. The article explores the influence of internal and external economic and political conditions on Angola's development, under circumstances of war, and speculates on Angola's immediate future. The article argues, in particular, that Angola's elites have used the civil war as an excuse behind which to hide atrocious economic policy.

The "curse of natural resources" is often highlighted as the main cause to both poor economic performance & corruption in producing countries. However, it does not have to be that way. The example of Angola, with its huge oil reserves & diamonds deposits, is usually pointed out as a typical case of a "cursed" country. This article embraces the Angolan politics of natural resources from the point of view of its foreign policy, showing how it strengthens both its bargaining power & the rent-seeking behavior of its leaders. It concludes by stressing the relative success of that policy, even towards the IMF demands, yet without any kind of benefits to the Angolan people. Unfortunately, the way ahead seems to indicate that reinforcing the exploitation of natural resources is the future path. References. Adapted from the source document.

Das Verhalten der Elite im Einparteiensystem Angolas wurde kaum kontrolliert, wegen der Entwicklung der militärischen Situation konnte der Staat trotz der mit dem Bürgerkrieg verbundenen ökonomischen Schwierigkeiten überleben. Aufgrund des Niedergangs anderer Sektoren gewann das Erdöl immer mehr an Bedeutung. Ab 1987 wurde mit wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen begonnen. 1991 mit Beginn der Demokratisierung paßte sich die herrschende Elite, die vom bisherigen Wirtschaftssystem profitiert hatte, den neuen Bedingungen an und schuf eine den veränderten Verhältnissen angepaßte Unternehmerklasse. (DÜI-Wgm)

In this article we will examine to what extent Portuguese economic diplomacy has worked having in mind the national interest and business interests. The analysis will focus on the cases of Galp and Unicer. We will start to enunciate the relevant aspects that connect economic diplomacy and business diplomacy; then we will review the evolution and characteristics of Portuguese economic diplomacy; and finally we will study the Galp and Unicer presence in the Angolan market. The main conclusions may allow a more rigorous definition of the Portuguese economic diplomacy model. Adapted from the source document.