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Manipulation als eine Form der Beeinflussung hat einen schlechten Ruf. Auch im psychosozialen Bereich werden mitunter Anklagen von Manipulation laut. Manipulation kann, muss aber nicht problematisch sein. Philosoph und Therapeut Dr. Alexander Fischer analysiert, wie Manipulation konzeptualisiert werden kann, wie sie im psychosozialen Bereich aussehen mag, und wann sie problematisch wird.

This thesis is a longitudinal study of judicial power in India and captures the history of the Supreme Court from the perspective of positive political theory. Combining measurements of competitiveness of political participation with quantitative indicators that describe the court as a composite actor, the thesis identifies both the structuration of opportunities for judicial power expansion as well as critical junctures resulting from the court's strategic choices. Each chapter combines empirical data and historiographic narratives to portray such phases of institutional flux, re-conceptualizing the overall trend towards judicial power expansion as distinct sequences of judicial overreach, jurisdiction stripping, and judicial self-empowerment alternating between regime supportive judicial activism and judicial assertiveness. Like all good dependent variables the power of the Indian Supreme Court thus varies over time, while the theoretical frameworks for tying together this thesis always derive from the same paradigm of separation-of-power-games, drawing on strategic approaches in judicialization studies to explain juristocratic patterns of judicial power expansion in India.

This article explores the constitutional ideology of the social revolution in the context of liberal economic reforms in India. While India's new economic policies emphasize the benefits of competition and free markets her constitutional preferences remain embedded in legal provisions and traditions that favor social engineering in the name of economic, political and social equality. As liberalization as well as the global marketplace have become firmly established in the rhetoric and practice of elite politics, the political momentum towards economic change falls short of the numerical majorities to amend the Constitution. Consequently, India's Supreme Court judges are taking centre-stage in the field of economic liberalization, having the power to either stall or accelerate the reform process by means of judicial review. Unrestrained by the political obstacles of democratic politics the court has sketched a dialectical reform of the constitutional political economy exercising judicial restraint as the means and modes of production are freed from state control and exposing judicial activism as the judges advocate the interweaving of the distribution and consumption of wealth with the goals of the social revolution. Based on an analysis of judicial policies as well as constitutional reform debates the article maintains that the constitutional ideology of the social revolution acts as an important, if not constructive, constraint and guideline as India's policies are shifting from "empirical gradualist" socialism to empirical gradualist liberalization and globalization.