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Abstract
Several watershed events preceded the dissolution of Yugoslavia. One of these was the toppling of the Vojvodina autonomist leadership in October 1988. This was preceded by a series of rallies throughout Vojvodina in the summer of 1988, which may have seemed like a spontaneous affair and the work of "ordinary citizens." It was called "the antibureaucratic revolution." However, these rallies, including a standing group of demonstrators, continually and always referring to the grievances of Kosovo Serbs, turned out to be supported by the Serbian political elite centered in Belgrade. The elite, still headed by the Serbian Communist Chief Slobodan Milošević, gave thrust and coordination to efforts to organize the rallies. The Vojvodina leadership was toppled for their alleged "failing to understand the plight of Kosovo Serbs." The overthrow was, further, with a view to achieve the Serbian elite's pet project, the "united Serbia"—that is, doing away with Vojvodina's and Kosovo's autonomy. Written sources (including recollections by Yugoslav leaders of the time) and written sources are considered in research on the events.

The Slovene national movement of the late nineteenth century was based primarily on the myth of an eternal linguistic community, an essentialist position within historiography. The national development itself best fits into patterns described by Hroch and Gellner. Although most objective conditions for national constitution were met by 1929, it is not clear if subjective ones had been met by that time. World War II revitalized the nation-constitution process, particularly by warring Communist- and Catholic-supported political and military factions, both claiming to fight for a Slovene identity, while Communists also claimed to be fighting for a "Greater" (Megali) Slovenia. With the war's end, and Slovenia becoming a Yugoslav republic and expanding geographically, there was no doubt of a Slovene national identity, as understood by Connor, among the general population. However, important developments followed in nation-constitution after 1945, particularly upon gaining independence in 1991. The process need not be considered completed. Slovenes may be considered leaning towards a cultural type nation, with a cultural nucleus in an essentialist understanding of the Slovene language.

Since attaining independence, Latin pattern (Martin, 1978) disputes and conflicts have characterized the Slovenian political scene, particularly as to relations between the state and religious communities. Slovenia adopted a law on the issue only in 2006, availing itself of the law from the 1970s. The 2007 Religious Freedom Act contained many privileges for the dominant Roman Catholic Church, including those of a symbolic nature and those of an economic one. The Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional and void, departing from the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it set other beliefs at the same level with religious ones, did away with many privileges and obstacles 81 in recognition and registration of new religious communities. However, this decision has legislatively been implemented only in a small portion, remaining to be fully implemented. However, the absence of substantive agreements with the Holy See and the absence of religious instruction in public schools indicate a predominance of liberalism on the public scene. ; Od sticanja nezavisnosti, Latinski obrazac (Martin, 1978) svojstven je za Sloveniju, posebno za odnos između države i verskih zajednica. Slovenija je usvojila zakon o tom pitanju tek 2007, služeći se do tada odredbama odgovarajućeg zakona iz 1970-ih godina. Zakon o verskoj slobodi iz 2006. sadržao je brojne privilegije za preovlađujuću Rimsko-katoličku crkvu, uključujući simboličke i ekonomske. Međutim, Ustavni sud Slovenije ubrzo je utvrdio protivustavnost i poništio taj zakon, polazeći od Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima i pravne prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. Time su druga verovanja postavljena u istu ravan sa religioznima i uklonjene brojne privilegije i prepreke kod priznanja i registracije novih verskih zajednica. Međutim, ta presuda nije u celosti zakonodavno primenjena. Ipak, odsustvo sadržinskih sporazuma sa Svetom stolicom i veronauke u javnim školama ukazuje na prevlast liberalizma na javnoj sceni.

Since attaining independence, Latin pattern (Martin, 1978) disputes and conflicts have characterized the Slovenian political scene, particularly as to relations between the state and religious communities. Slovenia adopted a law on the issue only in 2006, availing itself of the law from the 1970s. The 2007 Religious Freedom Act contained many privileges for the dominant Roman Catholic Church, including those of a symbolic nature and those of an eco¬nomic one. The Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional and void, departing from the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it set other beliefs at the same level with religious ones, did away with many privileges and obstacles in recognition and registration of new religious communities. However, this decision has legislatively been implemented only in a small portion, remaining to be fully implemented. However, the absence of substantive agreements with the Holy See and the absence of religious instruction in public schools indi¬cate a pre do mi nan ce of li be ralism on the pu blic sce ne.

Since attaining independence, Latin pattern (Martin, 1978) disputes and
conflicts have characterized the Slovenian political scene, particularly as
to relations between the state and religious communities. Slovenia adopted a
law on the issue only in 2006, availing itself of the law from the 1970s. The
2007 Religious Freedom Act contained many privileges for the dominant Roman
Catholic Church, including those of a symbolic nature and those of an
economic one. The Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional and
void, departing from the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law
of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it set other beliefs at the same
level with religious ones, did away with many privileges and obstacles 81 in
recognition and registration of new religious communities. However, this
decision has legislatively been implemented only in a small portion,
remaining to be fully implemented. However, the absence of substantive
agreements with the Holy See and the absence of religious instruction in
public schools indicate a predominance of liberalism on the public scene.

Pavković vidi nestanak Jugoslavije kao niz činova otcepljenja republika i jedne pokrajine. Nasuprot tome, tvrdi se da je proces raspadanja jugoslovenske države kompleksna pojava, da je prouzrokovan nedostatkom političke legitimnosti nakon Titove smrti, nestankom geopolitičke uloge Jugoslavije, ugrađenom malfunkcionalnošću savezne države, ekonomskim teškoćama koje su spontano tumačene kao pojave proizašle iz navodne privilegovanosti drugih jedinica unutar sistema, nesposobnošću stare elite da modifikuje institucionalni, posebno privredni sistem, transformacijom elita u republičke i nacionalne građanske elite, širenjem straha za opstanak nacija i u suštini spontanim prestankom delovanja savezne države. Slovenija i Srbija prve su 1990. g. preuzele uloge nezavisnih država, pošto je savezna institucionalna ravnoteža bila poremećena oduzimanjem ovlašćenja pokrajinama. Jugoslovenska država prestala je da postoji prestankom njenog efektivnog delovanja, njene efektivne vlasti. Sami činovi otcepljenja u tome imali su malu ulogu. Čak ni ceo subjektivni faktor (htenja, namere, akteri, izvršioci) nije imao znatniju uzročnu težinu. ; Pavković understand the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a series of acts secession by republics and a province of the former SFRY. Contrary to this, here, it is asserted that the process of dissolution of the Yugoslav state was a complex one, involving the failure of political legitimacy after Tito's death, the disappearance of Yugoslavia's geopolitical role, the built in malfunctioning of the federal state, economic difficulties which were spontaneously interpreted as pursuing from the alleged privileged position of other units within the system, the inability of the old elite to modify the institutional, particularly the economic system, the transformation this elite into republic and national bourgeois elites, inciting of fears in lower strata on the possibility of the very disappearance of nations and, not least, the substantial cessation of operation of the federal state. Slovenia and Serbia were the first in 1990 to take over roles of independent states, after the federal balance was disturbed by the stripping of jurisdiction of provinces. The Yugoslav state disappeared by the cessation of its effective operation, its effective power. The acts of secession played a small role in this process. The entire subjective factor (will, intentions, actors, executors) did not bear a major causal weight.

Religious life is studied by way suggested by the rational choice theory and
the religious capital theory. The basic contentions of the theory on the
nature of religious life having to do with an exchange upon a religious
market, by firms offering compensators and rewards, and consumers, is
considered. In the empirical analysis, it was validated that the independent
(religious capital) and dependent (religious rewards of two types) were
empirically separate constructs. Cross-sectional analysis of survey data
indicated a very strong association between religious capital and
institutional and ritual experience rewards within religious life, at a
cross-cultural analysis, including Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Orthodox,
Slovenian Catholics and US Protestants. The association was confirmed as
robust at regression inspection with religious socialization. This extends
further support for the empirical validity these novel theories of religious
life and extensions of economic analysis into religious life.

In the text regimes of religious community registration by statutory law in European countries is reviewed. Although freedom of religion is declared as a pricniple at the European level and individual constitutional provisions, varied obstacles to registering religious communities are set. They may reflect fear of abuse of religion or the intent to safeguard the hegemony of a traditionally entrenched religion. Some of these obstacles are historically entrenched, whereas in post-Communist countries they have been set during democrratic reconstruction. States differ in conditions for registration, in bodies competent to act upon such supplications, procedures in reviewing them and in practice. A trend toward reaching the standards set by the Europeaн Convention on Human Rights may be discerned. The major policies of the Venice Commission regarding religious liberty and a number of standard setting judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, regarding religious liberty, particularly within the registration of religious groups are reviewed in continuation. These policies and judgments ensue from a strict vision of individual and collective religious rights and may collide with traditional religious cultures favouring an entrenched church, within various confessional traditions in Europe. These opinions and judgments present a limited but important instrument of affirmation of religious liberty and suppressing state arbitrariness in the treatment of religious freedom, particularly of minority groups and beliefs. Problems of Orthodox cultures are stressed.

The author attempts to demonstrate that the concept of civil religion is appropriate and illuminating in comprehending the culture and society of Communist Yugoslavia (1945-1991). Though manifestly contrary to theism, numerous elements of this civil religion make it deserving of the name: it contained a tale of an alleged sacred historical past and a transhistorical mission of the Yugoslav peoples, including an eschatology, and a sacred covenant. President Tito's charisma was the major element of this civil religion, the idea of a broken covenant was present, along with the rule of equalitarianism (particularly as a wealth taboo) at the ethical level. When Tito's physical presence disappeared, the entire civil religion was doomed (there was no possibility of routinizing and depersonalizing charisma), as well as the society it legitimated. Because of the charismatic nature of legitimation and the basically authoritarian nature of this cultural pattern, transformation into rational-legal legitimation was blocked.

In this paper certain attractive explanations, present in sociological and other scholarship, on the dismemberment of Yugoslavia are considered through a review of unpublished survey and census data on the former Yugoslavia immediately preceding its break-up. Particularly one influential, but biased explanation of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia articulated in the works of the sociologist Stjepan Meštrović merit further attention in the depiction of bias towards the Yugoslav break-up. The paper refutes that there was a fundamental incompatibility based on authoritarianism of any nationality, on emotional instability of any nationality, of ethnic stratification, of ethnic distance among the basic groups, which may explain the break-up. These explanations fall within ethnic essentialism, down-playing historicity and structure within ethnic groups, and the manipulability of concepts of ethnicity. I propose that the break-up can be explained by a set of structural and processual factors of a political and cultural nature, where one can conclude that the former Yugoslavia served as a nation-building institution, but for numerous nationalities.