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When crisis strikes, where do evacuees go? This question affects how policymakers and first responders allocate their time, funds, and resources after disaster. While past research compared evacuation rates of cities within the same disaster, evacuation among different types of disasters remain under-examined. This mixed methods study compares evacuation patterns from 7,631 cities among 10 major disasters in the US and Japan between 2019 and 2020, combining social network analysis, modeling, and visualization. This study highlights that evacuation from some hazards is more alike than others; large, sprawling disasters, including some storms, fires, and power outages trigger both clustered and dispersed evacuation networks, while smaller, focused disaster result in mainly dispersed evacuation networks. Further, cities with similar levels of social capital tend to see greater evacuation between them. By uncovering the different shapes and drivers of evacuation networks across different disasters, scholars can clarify where evacuees go and which kinds of cities need additional support after crisis.

ObjectivesThis mixed‐methods study examines whether governance and disasters affect towns that host more renewable power plants, focusing on solar facilities in Japan after the 3/11 disaster.MethodsI tested the effects of various factors on multiple sizes of feed‐in tariff certified solar power plants with negative binomial models. I confirmed those effects through process tracing using 14 interviews with local stakeholders from two prefectural case studies.ResultsMost prefectures boost solar power plant siting, especially for small plants 10–499 kilowatts (kW) in size. However, towns more damaged by disaster host less 10–499 kW plants because disasters create land‐use problems for solar.ConclusionWhen prefectures share information about renewable resources with local residents, they can compete more evenly with extraprefectural companies. However, disaster areas face extra governance challenges when introducing solar. Good subnational governance is vital to creating a more equitable, locally engaged renewable energy transition.

We investigate why some communities experience worse COVID-19 outcomes than others. Past studies have linked the resilience of communities against crisis to social vulnerability and the capacity of local governments to provide public goods and services like health care. Disaster studies, which frequently examine the effect of social ties and mobility, may better help illuminate the current spread of COVID-19. We analyze Japan's 47 prefectures from February 12 to August 31 using 62,722 individual confirmed cases of COVID-19, paired with daily tallies of aggregate Facebook user movement among neighborhoods. Controlling for mobility levels, health care systems, government finance, gender balance, age, income, and education levels of communities, our analysis indicates that areas with strong linking social ties see no or far lower levels of COVID-19 case rates initially. However, case fatality rates rise in such communities once the disease enters as they lack horizontal (bonding) ties which can mitigate its health impacts. We anticipate this study to be a starting point for broader studies of how social ties and mobility influence COVID-19 outcomes worldwide along with shining a light on how different types of social relationships play different roles as a crisis or disaster progresses.

Since the 3/11 compounded disasters, Japanese energy policy, especially its nuclear policy, has been paralyzed. After the Fukushima disasters, public opinion turned against nuclear energy while the central government continued to push for restarts of the many offline reactors. Based on nearly thirty interviews with relevant actors and primary and secondary materials, we use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and five case studies to illuminate the impact of conditions influencing reactor restarts in Japan after 3/11. We investigate which local actors hold the greatest power to veto nuclear power policy, and why and when they choose to use it. Key decisions in nuclear power policy involve approval from multiple institutions with varying legal jurisdiction, making vetoes the result of multiple actors and conditions. Certain legal and political factors, such as court, regulator, and gubernatorial opposition (or support), matter more than technical factors (such as the age of the reactor or its size) and other political factors (such as town council or prefectural assembly opposition or support). Local politics can stymie a national government's nuclear policy goals through combinations of specific physical conditions and vetoes from relevant actors, rather than through the actions of local opposition or single "heroic" governors. Our findings challenge the assumption that utilities unilaterally accept a governor's vetoes, but reinforce the notion that specific judicial and electoral veto players are blocking an otherwise expected return to a pro-nuclear status quo. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

AbstractThe 2020 U.S. presidential election saw rising political tensions among ordinary voters and political elites, with fears of election violence culminating in the January 6 riot. We hypothesized that the 2020 election might have been traumatic for some voters, producing measurable symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). We also hypothesized that negative sentiment toward the opposing party correlates with PTSD. We measured PTSD using a modified version of the PCL-5, a validated PTSD screener, for 573 individuals from a nationally representative YouGov sample. We modeled the association between affective polarization and PTSD, controlling for political, demographic, and psychological traits. We estimate that 12.5% of American adults (95% CI: 9.2% to 15.9%) experienced election-related PTSD, far higher than the annual PTSD prevalence of 3.5%. Additionally, negativity toward opposing partisans correlated with PTSD symptoms. These findings highlight a potential need to support Americans affected by election-related trauma.