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The principal agent problem is one of the major issues of the credit rating agency market. Is it possible to solve the prevailing incentive problem of the market and contemporaneously satisfy the reputation demand of the investors? This paper presents an option for regulating the credit rating agency market more effectively. The market shall be coordinated through a central allocation office, which is acting as a mediator between both contractual parties. The paper develops a game theoretical approach that considers reputation as one of the most important aspects within the market. After analysing the status quo two policy options are discussed on a game theoretical basis. The main result is that the incorporation of a mediator, which awards the contracts based on a lottery drawing, would help to solve conflicts of interests. The incentive to inflate ratings decreases significantly. Moreover, rating shopping option becomes impossible. Two possible positive side effects for smaller CRAs and new incumbents are the increase of market share as well as reputation. Therefore, the market competition should be affected positively, too.

Some developing countries borrow abroad and experience good growth (above 2 %), which we call good growth, while others borrow and have poor growth (below 1 %), which we label as bad growth. The data comprise all 443 available observations of borrowing for one 5-year period and average growth rates for the following 10-year period. First, we confirm the standard result: The relation between borrowing and growth is negative, but explains little of the variations in the growth rate. Second, we select a subset of 59 twins of LDCs with matching borrowing (shares of GDP) in the same period. One twin has good growth and the other bad growth. The two sets are compared over a total of 12 main indicators from different fields. The good cases occur in countries with more economic and political freedom; also they are somewhat more developed, and have fewer natural resources. While this pattern is strong between samples, it is weak within samples.

"Securing the Global Economy explores how and why the G8 and other institutions of global governance deal with increasingly comprehensive and complex economic-security connections. These connections are explored from an interdisciplinary perspective, with economists, political scientists and those in the policy world bringing their insights to bear. Moreover, this volume explores this economic-security connection from a constitutional or institutional perspective. In a classical liberal spirit, it is concerned with the organizing principles of a liberal international economic order and the framework of rules that enables it to survive and flourish. Security issues, national trade policies, the multilateral trade system and the detailed technical issues they subsume are analysed from this higher vantage point. This is thus a work about global governance as a whole and at its core, rather than a problem-solving manual for a few of the issues now at centre stage. Furthermore, it applies this larger vision to the current G8 and global economic-security agenda to generate a set of policy recommendations about how the global community, through and outside the G8, can better cope with the complex interconnected challenges it now confronts. Its innovative policy recommendations are especially timely when the recent global financial crisis, economic recession and fragile recovery place great strains on the liberal economic order, while new challenges from Iran, ongoing terrorist threats and corruption make this security-economic connection critically important."--Provided by publisher.

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