Courts in Latin American Politics
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Courts in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Courts in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 62, Issue 4, p. 737-750
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: Comparative Politics 46(4): 479-498, July 2014
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In: Sociological methods and research
ISSN: 1552-8294
Interviews play a pivotal role in process tracing (PT) by allowing researchers to delve deep into the intricacies of agency, inter-agent interactions and relationships, and the processes underlying meaning and decision-making. These dimensions are essential for evaluating process theories connecting causes to outcomes in specific cases. Testing theoretical arguments via PT bears implications for how we conceive interviewing. We provide recommendations for scholars to design interview research aligned with PT best practices, focusing on sampling and the design of interview protocols, and being sensitive to differences between PT approaches. Aligning interviews with PT's specific requirements strengthens the weight and inferential power of evidence. While the methodological foundations of PT and related data analysis techniques are well-documented in the literature, there is still a gap concerning data collection and generation. We aim to address this by encouraging process tracers to think systematically about their interviewing plans at the design stage.
In: Law & Social Inquiry (forthcoming)
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In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Volume 60, Issue 2, p. 397-417
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractAs nationalist sentiments gain traction globally, the attitudinal and institutional foundations of the international liberal order face new challenges. One manifestation of this trend is the growing backlash against international courts. Defenders of the liberal order struggle to articulate compelling reasons for why states, and their citizens, should continue delegating authority to international institutions. This article probes the effectiveness of arguments that emphasise the appropriateness and benefits of cooperation in containing preferences for backlash among the mass public. We rely on IR theories that explain why elites create international institutions to derive three sets of arguments that could be deployed to boost support for international courts. We then use experimental methods to test their impact on support for backlash against the European Court of Human Rights in Britain (ECtHR). First, in line with principal‐agent models of delegation, we find that information about the court's reliability as an 'agent' boosts support for the ECtHR, but less so information that signals Britain's status as a principal. Second, in line with constructivist approaches, associating support for the court with the position of an in‐group state like Denmark, and opposition with an out‐group state like Russia, also elicits more positive attitudes. This finding points to the importance of 'blame by association' and cues of in/out‐group identity in building support for cooperation. The effect is stronger when we increase social pressure by providing information about social attitudes towards Denmark and Russia in Britain, where the public overwhelmingly trusts the Danes and distrusts the Russians. Finally, in contrast to Liberal explanations for the creation of the ECtHR, the study finds no evidence that highlighting the court's mission to promote democracy and international peace contains backlash. We show that the positive effects of the first two arguments are not driven by pre‐treatment attitudes such as political sophistication, patriotism, internationalism, institutional trust or political preferences.
In: International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2020
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Clientelism in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 67, Issue 2
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractFoundations provide key funds for nongovernmental organizations. We know little about what they do for transnational activism or the mechanisms via which they seek/achieve influence. We carve a middle ground between those who see donors as supporting actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and those who think they distort activism through impersonal market forces. Our negotiation-oriented approach looks at the micro-dynamics of donor–grantee relations. We argue that influence is a function of donors' organizational characteristics. Only some, especially foundations, have the vision/means to shape grantees. However, internal complexity can cause coordination problems, complicating influence. Additionally, if many donors exist, recipients' leverage increases. It does so too if their expertise is in short supply. Using archival evidence, we reconstruct how Ford tried to shape the Inter-American Human Rights Institute, a pillar of the region's human rights regime, and the factors conditioning success. For Ford, the Institute could play a role in a fledging TAN, but only if it downplayed its emphasis on research and directly engaged activists. Coupled with analyses of USAID's relationship with the Institute and Ford's relationship with Americas Watch, we shed light on the activities of an important class of donor and illuminate foundations' role in the development of TANs.
In: British journal of political science, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 629-648
ISSN: 1469-2112
AbstractCourts prosecuting corruption serve a critical horizontal accountability function, but they can also play a role in moments of vertical accountability when voters can sanction corrupt candidates. This article documents the strategic use of corruption lawsuits, demonstrating the presence of an electoral cycle in filing new corruption accusations against politicians. Using an original dataset of daily corruption complaints filed in federal courts against members of Argentina's main political coalitions between 2013 and 2021, we document increased corruption accusations against and by politicians in the periods immediately preceding an election. A second dataset of daily media coverage of corruption accusations in two leading newspapers suggests that corruption is more salient before elections, offering politicians a temporal focal point to prepare and launch especially impactful lawsuits. Our findings shed new light on using courts for accountability and debates about the so-called 'lawfare' in Latin America.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 197-211
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 197-211
ISSN: 1540-5907
Anti-vote-buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote-buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics. Adapted from the source document.
In: American journal of political science, Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 197-211
ISSN: 1540-5907
Anti‐vote‐buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote‐buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics.
In: Cambridge Studies in Law and Society Series
In: Journal of peace research, Volume 57, Issue 1, p. 46-61
ISSN: 1460-3578
How do parties target intimidation and vote-buying during elections? Parties prefer the use of carrots over sticks because they are in the business of getting voters to like them and expect higher legitimacy costs if observers expose intimidation. However, their brokers sometimes choose intimidation because it is cheaper and possibly more effective than vote-buying. Specifically, we contend that brokers use intimidation when the cost of buying votes is prohibitively high; in interactions with voters among whom the commitment problem inherent to clientelistic transactions is difficult to overcome; and in contexts where the risk of being denounced for violence is lower. We probe our hypotheses about the different profile of voters targeted with vote-buying and intimidation using two list experiments included in an original survey conducted during the 2011 Guatemalan general elections. The list experiments were designed to overcome the social desirability bias associated with direct questions about illegal or stigmatized behaviors. Our quantitative analysis is supplemented by interviews with politicians from various parties. The analysis largely confirms our expectations about the diametrically opposed logics of vote-buying and intimidation targeting, and illuminates how both are key components of politics in a country with weak parties and high levels of violence.