Search results

This article explores EU political elites' images of Georgia and its evolution from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author's 25 original interviews with EU political elites, including presidents, prime ministers and ministers of EU member states and EU commissioners, alongside primary documents. By triangulating between novel interview data, document analysis and statements by EU officials, this article unpacks EU perceptions of Georgia's intentions, capabilities, threats and cultural status over a 30-year historical period. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over time in the eyes of EU and EU member states leaders: first, Georgia as a willing partner to the EU; second, Georgia as a political partner to the EU and third, Georgia as a close political and economic partner to the EU. This article, by studying the EU political elites' images of Georgia, adds knowledge to the EU's perceptions of external actors, which is an under-researched topic in the scholarship of images and perceptions in EU external relations. Moreover, it extends the literature on EU-Georgia relations, and helps to understand some of their peculiarities.

This article explores EU political elites' images of Georgia and its evolution from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author's 25 original interviews with EU political elites, including presidents, prime ministers and ministers of EU member states and EU commissioners, alongside primary documents. By triangulating between novel interview data, document analysis and statements by EU officials, this article unpacks EU perceptions of Georgia's intentions, capabilities, threats and cultural status over a 30-year historical period. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over time in the eyes of EU and EU member states leaders: first, Georgia as a willing partner to the EU; second, Georgia as a political partner to the EU and third, Georgia as a close political and economic partner to the EU. This article, by studying the EU political elites' images of Georgia, adds knowledge to the EU's perceptions of external actors, which is an under-researched topic in the scholarship of images and perceptions in EU external relations. Moreover, it extends the literature on EU-Georgia relations, and helps to understand some of their peculiarities.

This article investigates U.S. and NATO political elite images of Georgia and policy implications from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author's 44 original interviews with U.S. and NATO political elites, including U.S. Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of States, U.S. Generals, Secretaries-General and Deputy Secretaries of NATO, and others in power in the different periods from 1991 to 2020. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over the 30-year historical period in the eyes of U.S. and NATO political elites. In the first two decades, leadership and personal connections have increased the likelihood of certain policies together with material determinants and ideational factors. In the third decade, personal ties had disappeared, but structural incentives were acknowledged by U.S. and NATO elites which impacted their policies. Moreover, results show that the U.S. relationship with Georgia has been chiefly personalized rather than institutionalized.

L'article traite du rôle de la Russie en ce qui concerne le projet européen de la Géorgie institué par le gouvernement du Mouvement national uni (MNU) en 2004-2012. Il se penche sur les raisons pour lesquelles le projet européen, qui prévoyait initialement des relations de coopération avec la Russie, a fini par faire de son voisin du nord son principal adversaire. Il ressort de cette étude que la politique pro-européenne en Géorgie comportait une adroite combinaison d'inclusion et d'exclusion de la Russie : le Kremlin a été exclu des questions intérieures géorgiennes tout en s'engageant dans les initiatives de politique étrangère de la Géorgie. Cette tactique s'est effondrée en 2008 en raison d'erreurs de calcul et de fautes aboutissant à faire de la Russie le principal ennemi du pays.