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AbstractThe European Commission presented its Open, Sustainable and Assertive (OSA) trade strategy in early 2021, heralding the document as representing a new and strategic approach to countering dependency and strengthening resiliency. We analyse the OSA through policy paradigms, making two contributions to the trade policy literature. First, we show that embedded liberalism and fair trade—often presented as two trade paradigms —are rather elements of one, namely managed globalisation (MG). Using qualitative and quantitative content analyses, we argue that MG has been more influential in shaping 21st‐century trade policy than heretofore recognised in the literature. Second, we show that the OSA represents a paradigmatic rebalancing and complementarity, between the MG and a realist trade‐as‐foreign‐policy paradigm. The OSA represents an EU seeking to increase its capabilities in order to defend its values and interests, while simultaneously promoting the return to a rules‐based liberal international trading order; the co‐dominance of MG and trade‐as‐foreign‐policy represent an evolution from managing interdependence to managing dependency.

The European Union (EU) presented its new trade strategy in early 2021. This article assesses whether the strategy constitutes a path-altering development in EU trade policy. Drawing on concepts from Historical Institutionalism the article assesses the presence and influence of the permissive and productive conditions necessary for a critical juncture, meaning a path-altering policy development, to occur. The permissive conditions refer to the external environment, while the productive conditions are internal, referring to ideational (cognitive and normative) and instrumental developments. We find that although the EU responded instrumentally to changes in the international trading system, and a loosening of the liberal international order, the new trade strategy was not accompanied by a complete ideational change. The EU's normative outlook was little changed in 2021. The conclusion discusses how subsequent changes in the international environment and trade instruments may affect EU trade policy, and whether, over a longer time-period, the new strategy may nonetheless be identified as the start of a critical juncture.
European Union, trade policy, geo-economics, strategy, strategic autonomy, critical juncture, permissive conditions, productive conditions

In recent years, scholars have called into question the often-heard policy statements that link a stronger single voice of the European Union (EU) to more European influence in international negotiations. This article examines this challenge in an area where the EU has a particularly long tradition of establishing common policies: agriculture. By comparing in particular the international agricultural negotiations that have taken place in the framework of the Uruguay and the Doha Development Rounds (up until Cancún), it argues that internal coherence is actually not a sufficient condition for EU influence in these negotiations. On the contrary, by building on different strands of literature - International Relations, EU studies and trade policy - it shows that the EU's ability to influence outcomes has been increasingly affected by external developments. More specifically, the article draws on three crucial external processes in this regard: First, emerging powers have gained substantial commercial weight. Second, key countries, especially Brazil, have played an increasingly active role in the negotiations. Third, these countries have strengthened their positions through successful coalition-building. Consequently, if European policy-makers want to increase the EU's influence in agricultural trade negotiations, they have to more consciously adapt its negotiation approaches to the changing external negotiation environment.

The European Community has provided financial support for cross-border territorial cooperation since 1990. The justification of the European Union (EU)'s current territorial cooperation policy for cross-border contiguous regions lies in its capacity to promote functional economic links between them. This capacity is based on two assumptions, namely that there is a relation between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the financial support provided by the EU, and that there is a relationship between the degree of institutional cooperation achieved and the development of functional economic links. This article attempts to measure both the impact of Community support on territorial institutional cooperation intensity and the impact of institutional cooperation intensity on economic functional links. This is done using primary data for EU-15 regions for the period between1992 and 2007.

Mercantilist policies, protectionism, Chinese and US violations of the spirit—if not always the rules—of the World Trade Organization, along with supply chain vulnerabilities, trade wars, and illegal state subsidies have all contributed to a rise in the weaponisation of commerce (using trade in response to, or to achieve, political decisions or acts) across the globe. The weaponisation and geo-politicisation of trade pose a challenge for the EU, which is poorly suited for a game of power politics. Its common commercial policy developed separately from the intergovernmental foreign and security policy. The level of exclusive EU competence differs across the two policy domains, as do decision-making processes. Drawing on work addressing ideational and instrumental levels of policy, we discuss how the EU is assessing the international environment through the ideational framework of strategic autonomy, and how this has shaped the construction of new trade defence instruments intended to protect against economic and technology-related security risks. Focusing specifically on trade defence instruments addressing security concerns, which are justified in the 2023 European Economic Security Strategy (especially in the pillar focusing on protecting against economic security risks), we show that the distinction between commercial policy and traditional security concerns is eroding.

Several studies have sought to explain the politicization of European Union's (EU) trade policy during negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA). This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of trade by assessing how politicization is addressed by those tasked with the content and implementation of trade policy, namely the European Commission (hereafter Commission). We identify the origin and definition of managed globalization (MG), and thereafter identify, through a qualitative content analysis of EU Trade Commissioners' speeches from 2013 to late 2017, how the doctrine re-emerged as the leitmotif of EU trade policy. The Commission's initial response to civil society organizations' contestation over TTIP and CETA was to insist on the economic benefits of the agreements. As contestation intensified, we find indirect references to MG, as the Commission focused on clarifying that upholding European values was equally important to market access in EU trade policy. Then, from late 2016 until late 2017, the Commission's messaging was directed primarily at populist fears of trade and globalization; emphasizing that protectionism was unnecessary, and that globalization could be controlled, culminating in the emergence of explicit references to MG. The article expands on existing research on MG by identifying trade politicization as a factor that prompted a modification and expansion of the MG doctrine and its use, while also discussing some accompanying policy changes.

Several studies have sought to explain the politicization of European Union's (EU) trade policy during negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA). This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of trade by assessing how politicization is addressed by those tasked with the content and implementation of trade policy, namely the European Commission (hereafter Commission). We identify the origin and definition of managed globalization (MG), and thereafter identify, through a qualitative content analysis of EU Trade Commissioners' speeches from 2013 to late 2017, how the doctrine re-emerged as the leitmotif of EU trade policy. The Commission's initial response to civil society organizations' contestation over TTIP and CETA was to insist on the economic benefits of the agreements. As contestation intensified, we find indirect references to MG, as the Commission focused on clarifying that upholding European values was equally important to market access in EU trade policy. Then, from late 2016 until late 2017, the Commission's messaging was directed primarily at populist fears of trade and globalization; emphasizing that protectionism was unnecessary, and that globalization could be controlled, culminating in the emergence of explicit references to MG. The article expands on existing research on MG by identifying trade politicization as a factor that prompted a modification and expansion of the MG doctrine and its use, while also discussing some accompanying policy changes.