How Much Power Do Oppositions Have? Comparing the Opportunity Structures of Parliamentary Oppositions in 21 Democracies
In: APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper
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In: APSA 2014 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 3, p. 655-657
ISSN: 1862-2860
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS : German political science quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 1, p. 183-186
ISSN: 1862-2860
In: PS: political science & politics, Volume 50, Issue 2, p. 413-417
ISSN: 1537-5935
In: The journal of legislative studies, Volume 23, Issue 1, p. 1-30
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Journal of European social policy, Volume 25, Issue 2, p. 139-158
ISSN: 1461-7269
This article provides a detailed analysis of individual preferences towards public financial aid to students from low-income families. Who favours/opposes such aid? What are the determinants of the respective preferences? I argue that three sets of factors jointly shape these preferences: materialistic self-interests, political attitudes, and the status quo of the higher education subsidy systems by generating positive feedback-effects. Results of multilevel ordered logit models utilizing the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data for up to 22 countries over two decades indicate that self-interest matters: students strongly favour subsidies as do their parents, while those paying for the spending and those not expecting to benefit oppose such aid. Moreover, political attitudes are important: Supporters of redistribution and of increased public education spending in general, as well as leftwing voters, are much more likely to support students. On the macro-level, the findings suggest that positive feedback-effects exist: in countries with generous subsidy systems, public support for subsidies is higher. This article is the first to systematically analyse preferences towards higher education subsidies across countries and time and demonstrates how positive feedback-effects increasingly lock-in countries' tuition-subsidy paths, making the systems resistant to (radical) change. As such, it speaks to the literature on the political economy of skill formation, the welfare state, public opinion and the public opinion–policy link.
This article contributes to the study of the demand side of welfare politics by investigating gender differences in social investment preferences systematically. Building on the different functions of social investment policies in creating, preserving, or mobilizing skills, we argue that women do not support social investment policies generally more strongly than men. Rather, women demand, in particular, policies to preserve their skills during career interruptions and help to mobilize their skills on the labour market. In a second analytical step, we examine women's policy priorities if skill preservation and mobilization come at the expense of social compensation. We test our arguments for eight Western European countries with data from the INVEDUC survey. The confirmation of our arguments challenges a core assumption of the literatures on the social investment turn and women's political realignment. We discuss the implication of our findings in the conclusion. ; Peer Reviewed
BASE
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration
ISSN: 1468-0491
AbstractPolicy‐making is a complex business. While scholars have studied the politics of policy‐making for decades, we know surprisingly little about the role of individual ministries. We argue that and why individual ministries crucially shape policies' content, particularly their distributive profiles. We explain that it matters whether for example, a Ministry of Labor, of Finance, or of Home Affairs designs a policy. First, we systematically review existing literature on the factors that influence preferences of ministries and their power in policy‐making. Second, we develop a theory explaining that and why ministries have substantive policy impact and introducing a typology of three different ministerial ideal‐types: ministries follow a "social logic", an "efficiency logic", or a "law‐and‐order logic". Third, we offer systematic empirical evidence: Using the least likely case of Germany, we introduce a novel content‐coded dataset on all social policies in the Bundestag since 1969, showing that ministries shape policies' distributive profiles, even when controlling for rival explanations, such as the partisan affiliation of ministers, the policy field, or cabinet type. We conclude by developing a research agenda on ministerial politics and highlight important implications for representation and responsiveness.
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, p. 1-17
ISSN: 2049-8489
Abstract
Liberalization is a perennial topic in politics and political science. We first review a broad scholarly debate, showing that the mainstream theories make rival and contradictory claims regarding the role of political parties in (de)liberalization reforms. We then develop a framework of conditional partisan influence, arguing that and under what conditions parties matter. We test our (and rival) propositions with a new dataset on (de)liberalization reforms in 23 democracies since 1973 covering several policy areas. Methodologically, we argue that existing quantitative studies are problematic: They rely on time-series cross-section models using country-year observations; but governments do not change annually, so that the number of observations is artificially inflated, resulting in incorrect estimates. We propose mixed-effects models instead, with country-year observations nested in cabinets, which are nested in countries and years. The results show under what conditions parties matter for (de)liberalization. More generally, the paper argues that mixed-effects models should become the new standard for studying partisan influences.
In: Journal of European social policy, Volume 31, Issue 3, p. 253-266
ISSN: 1461-7269
This article contributes to the study of the demand side of welfare politics by investigating gender differences in social investment preferences systematically. Building on the different functions of social investment policies in creating, preserving, or mobilizing skills, we argue that women do not support social investment policies generally more strongly than men. Rather, women demand, in particular, policies to preserve their skills during career interruptions and help to mobilize their skills on the labour market. In a second analytical step, we examine women's policy priorities if skill preservation and mobilization come at the expense of social compensation. We test our arguments for eight Western European countries with data from the INVEDUC survey. The confirmation of our arguments challenges a core assumption of the literatures on the social investment turn and women's political realignment. We discuss the implication of our findings in the conclusion.
This article contributes to the study of the demand side of welfare politics by investigating gender differences in social investment preferences systematically. Building on the different functions of social investment policies in creating, preserving, or mobilizing skills, we argue that women do not support social investment policies generally more strongly than men. Rather, women demand, in particular, policies to preserve their skills during career interruptions and help to mobilize their skills on the labour market. In a second analytical step, we examine women's policy priorities if skill preservation and mobilization come at the expense of social compensation. We test our arguments for eight Western European countries with data from the INVEDUC survey. The confirmation of our arguments challenges a core assumption of the literatures on the social investment turn and women's political realignment. We discuss the implication of our findings in the conclusion.
BASE
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Volume 59, Issue 3, p. 624-645
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractWelfare is the largest expenditure category in all advanced democracies. Consequently, much literature has studied partisan effects on total and policy‐specific welfare expenditure. Yet, these results cannot be trusted: the methodological standard is to apply time‐series cross‐section regressions to annual observation data. But governments hardly change annually. Thus, the number of observations is artificially inflated, leading to incorrect estimates. While this problem has recently been acknowledged, it has not been convincingly resolved. This article proposes mixed‐effects models (also known as 'multilevel models' or 'hierarchical models') as a solution, which allows decomposing variance into different levels and permits complex cross‐classification data structures. It is argued that mixed‐effects models combine the strengths of existing methodological approaches while alleviating their weaknesses. Empirically, partisan effects on total and on disaggregated expenditure in 23 OECD countries in the period 1960–2012 are studied using several measures of party preferences and revealing several substantially relevant findings.
In: Journal of European public policy, Volume 23, Issue 4, p. 510-530
ISSN: 1466-4429