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Can international organizations (IOs) gain independence from their member states, even if their decisions arise from member state bodies? While organizational independence is a precondition for the autonomy and agency of IOs, International Relations theory cannot yet grasp IO independence in the absence of institutional agents like secretariats. Drawing on collective actor theories with a strong micro-foundation from philosophy and sociology, this article demonstrates how organizational rules and procedures gradually shape organizational processes and produce collective effects that do not arise from the aggregation of member state activities. Member-dominated IOs can produce collective beliefs about relevant parts of the outside world that differ from the aggregated beliefs of member states. They can comprise institutionalized organizational goals and criteria that indicate collective intentions of organizational action and differ from the aggregate preferences of member states. They can comprise decision-making procedures that foster organizational decisions according to collective beliefs and intentions and reduce or abolish the relevance of bargaining and preference aggregation. Finally, they can act in ways that do not immediately rely on implementation action by the member states or by other lower-level actors. I conclude that analyzing the sources of independence of member-dominated IOs from their members sheds light on the nature and effects of IOs as group actors.

Abstract.  Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an (almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision‐making. Second, drawing on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation supports the transformation of interaction from interest‐based bargaining to deliberative arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence.

"Whereas the delegation of regulatory powers is usually examined from the principal's
perspective, this article explores the consequences of delegation for the regulatory
output. Empirically, it finds that the dissolution of the original German postal authority led
to the establishment of a system of divided labour in which different actors, including an
(almost) independent regulatory agency, depend on each other's performance of specialized
functions. Theoretically, it contributes to the ongoing debate over the role and operation of
independent agencies in two main respects. First, based on the modern theory of social
systems, it draws attention to the fact that the reform process was characterized by an
increased functional differentiation of institutionalized decision-making. Second, drawing
on the Habermasian theory of communicative action, it is argued that functional differentiation
supports the transformation of interaction from interest-based bargaining to deliberative
arguing both in the legislative and the administrative arenas. As political actors are
made unable to resort to their power resources, reasons become a key source of influence." (author's abstract)

"The environmental policy of the European Community is nested within
a broader institution devoted predominantly to market integration. It also co-exists with
the domestic environmental policies of the member states. This institutional arrangement
has important consequences for environmental governance in the present Union. Not
only does the wide scope for domestic environmental action generate different logics of
harmonization for the regulation of products and processes, it also creates an institutional
preference for European product standards because this type of regulation allows a
trade-off between environmental and single market concerns. This effect is demonstrated
by the development of the originally purely environmentally motivated and processrelated
directive on packaging and packaging waste adopted in 1994. During its
preparation, this legislative project was supplemented with a strong product-related
component that made a trade-off between policies possible and facilitated majority
support in the Council." (author's abstract)

"It is common to juxtapose inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism as the
two most important, and seemingly mutually exclusive, frameworks to interpret
the phenomenon of 'European integration' and its institutional dimension, the
European Community. Inter-governmentalism promises to offer a broadly applicable concept for the
analysis of international cooperative institutions. It recognises that the Community
emerged from the self-help based international system and emphasises
the continuing central role of the member states. However, conceiving of the
Community as one international institution among many others it tends to
disregard the specificities of this particular institution. Moreover, inter-governmentalism
is conceptionally founded on a state-centred and static approach to
institutions and cannot, therefore, cope with integration as a process of development
over time, nor does it readily accommodate the role of non-state actors
within the Community system." (author's abstract)

Annotation This systematic investigation of the interaction among international and European institutions provides both a theoretical framework for analysis and the first broad overview of this largely uncharted field of research. By offering detailed case studies and a systematic analysis of results, the book examines the effects of institutional interaction on environmental governance and explores the ways in which international and European Union policies can either reinforce or undercut one another. After a conceptual overview in which Oberthür and Gehring identify three causal mechanisms by which institutional interaction can affect environmental governance, ten case studies apply this theoretical approach. Six cases use an international institution as their starting point and four begin with a European Union legal instrument. The international regimes examined include the widely known Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and World Trade Organization and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The EU instruments analyzed include lesser-known directives on the protection of habitats, the deliberate release of genetically modified organisms into the environment, and air quality. The studies show that although conflict and interference among different regimes and institutions do take place, synergistic interactions are common. The findings on the importance of, and mechanisms behind, these outcomes offer valuable insights for both scholars and policymakers. Contributors:Beatrice Chaytor, Clare Coffey, Andrew Farmer, Thomas Gehring, John Lanchbery, Sebastian Oberthür, Alice Palmer, G. Kristin Rosendal, Jon Birger Skjærseth, Olav Schram Stokke, Ingmar von Homeyer, Jacob Werksman, Jørgen Wettestad.