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Administrative regulation : an introduction -- Judicial review of agency action : an initial look -- Constitutional rights to hearings under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments -- The background and genesis of the Administrative Procedure Act -- An alternative model of administration : independent adjudication -- The choice of action by rule or by ad hoc adjudication or other means -- Judicial review of agency rules and rulemaking : an introduction -- The "hard look" doctrine and judicial review of agency reasoning -- The administrative record and related matters -- Procedural problems incident to judicial review -- Constitutional dimensions of administrative regulation

In February 1986 the United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. Berkeley' upheld the validity of a municipal rent control ordinance against a contention that the Sherman Act preempted the ordinance. In an eight-to-one decision, the Court effectively gave the coup de grace to its earlier attempt to apply the federal antitrust laws to municipalities and political subdivisions. It also may have finally ended the remarkable series of disingenuous state-action decisions that had become an almost regular part of the Court's calendar since Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar' in 1975.Fisher holds a promise of restoring to the state-action exemption a simplicity and predictability not seen since Parker v. Brown. This Article examines the origin, history, and scope of the state-action doctrine of federal antitrust law-a doctrine exempting state legislation and other (generally regulatory) activity from invalidation by the federal antitrust laws. The Article describes the ways in which the Court increasingly confused and elaborated that doctrine. The Article examines in particular how the Court's recent decisions involving the relation of federal antitrust law to municipal legislation spun a web of confusion and uncertainty from which the Court itself has been forced to withdraw; how the lower federal courts refused to apply the Court's state-action precedents with which they disagreed; and how even the Congress was provoked into action to undo some of the uncertainties engendered by these decisions. The examination of the state-action doctrine attempts to identify the concerns underlying the Court's recent state-action decisions and to show why the series of state-action decisions since 1975 has been a failure. The Article also attempts to delineate the proper reach of federal antitrust law and to provide a reasoned basis for its conclusions. The analysis includes an assessment of Fisher v. Berkeley and its ramifications for the relation between federal antitrust law and the regulatory laws of states and local governments. ...

How is it that two broadly similar systems of competition law have reached different results across a number of significant antitrust issues? While the US and the EU share a commitment to maintaining competition in the marketplace and employ similar concepts and legal language in making antitrust decisions, differences in social values, political institutions, and legal precedent have inhibited close convergence. This book explores many of the main contested areas of contemporary antitrust, including mergers, price discrimination, predatory pricing, and intellectual property.

The U.S. and the EU have somewhat similar antitrust policies, and both have been globally influential. This article, however, argues that the differences between the two systems of antitrust are deep and fundamental and that convergence is therefore sharply constrained. We explore those contentions by examining differing goals, differing procedures, and differing policies.