Migration and culture
In: Frontiers of economcis and globalization 8
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In: Frontiers of economcis and globalization 8
In: CESifo working paper series 1413
The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as 'principals' and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen- candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as 'agents'. In the second setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take the dual role of 'principals' in one stage of the public-policy game and 'agents' in its second stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests.
In: Discussion paper series 4616
In: Labour economics
In: Discussion paper series 4617
In: Labour economics
In: IZA Discussion paper series 168
The social contract of the welfare state can be strained by the arrival of immigrants who receive welfare payments financed by citizens' taxes. We show, however, that the presence of unemployed immigrants receiving welfare payments is consistent with social harmony. The social harmony, which is a consequence of a view of unemployment as a labor-market discipline, contrasts with the social conflict predicted by Karl Marx when he proposed his earlier version of the same explanation for unemployment. We demonstrate that a socially harmonious policy is always feasible. Outcomes without social harmony can therefore always be suitably amended.
In: Discussion paper series 73
Migration has a strong economic impact on the sending and host countries. Since individuals and groups do not benefit equally from migration, interest groups emerge to protect and take care of their narrow self-interests and compete for rents generated by migration. Narrow self-interests may be present not only for interest groups but also for ruling politicians and civil servants. In this paper we consider how political culture is important for determining policy and how interest groups affect, via a lobbying process, the choice of public policy. We also consider how interest groups and lobbying activities affect assimilation and attitudes towards migrants and international trade. The narrow interests of the different groups may cause a decrease in social welfare, in some cases, and may enhance welfare in other situations.
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6850
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In: Frontiers of Economics and Globalization; Migration and Culture, p. 25-44
In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Volume 34, Issue 4, p. 567-584
ISSN: 1369-183X
In: Journal of ethnic and migration studies: JEMS, Volume 34, Issue 4, p. 567-583
ISSN: 1469-9451
SSRN
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 16, Issue 1, p. 95-111