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"The Political Economy of Aid Conditionality" published on by Oxford University Press.

Phoenix states after civil war --. - Reconstruction against all odds --. - Statistical analysis of postconflict reconstruction --. - Statistical analysis of postconflict coup risk --. - Similar background, different windfall: Mozambique and Angola --. - Same country, change in windfall: Uganda --. - Improving aid effectiveness after civil war

Reducing coup risk is imperative and expensive for postconflict leaders. A theoretical framework is therefore needed to explain the subset of leaders who spend on development following civil war. The low-windfall coup-proofing hypothesis proposed here suggests that only postconflict leaders who lack natural resources and offer no strategic importance to donors choose to reduce coup risk by using nonstrategic aid for development. A nested research design with data on post-conflict coups (1970-2009) and a case study based on fieldwork are used to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported across robustness checks, indicating that development from aid reduces coup risk for postconflict leaders with low windfall. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

Reducing coup risk is imperative and expensive for postconflict leaders. A theoretical framework is therefore needed to explain the subset of leaders who spend on development following civil war. The low-windfall coup-proofing hypothesis proposed here suggests that only postconflict leaders who lack natural resources and offer no strategic importance to donors choose to reduce coup risk by using nonstrategic aid for development. A nested research design with data on postconflict coups (1970–2009) and a case study based on fieldwork are used to test the hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported across robustness checks, indicating that development from aid reduces coup risk for postconflict leaders with low windfall.

When does aid foster development after civil war? A testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development. This article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis, an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals. Paradoxically, incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income. Ten-year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970-96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis. By focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients, and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals, the nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war, when institutions are weak. Adapted from the source document.