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Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
In: Discussion paper series 7066
In: Public policy
Information technology, efficient restructuring and the productivity puzzle
In: Discussion paper series 6109
In: Industrial organization and international macroeconomics
Protocol design and (de-)centralization
In: Discussion paper series 6357
In: Public policy
Collective decisions with interdependent valuations
In: Discussion paper series 3003
In: International macroeconomics and public policy
Unemployment and labor market reform: a contract theoretic approach
In: Discussion paper No. 584
Capital redistribution and the market allocation of firm-ownership
In: Discussion paper 545
Political redistribution: the role of delegated lobbying and wage bargaining
In: Diskussionsbeiträge
In: Serie 2 272
Optimal institutions for monetary policy: contracts, shocks and signaling
In: Diskussionsbeiträge
In: Serie 2 251
Redistributive policy, inequality and growth
Does redistribution increase inequality? Is inequality harmfiil for growth? Both questions have recently been addressed in a number of single-tax models. In this paper, I examine the relationship between policy, growth and inequality when income and wealth can be taxed at different rates. In the model, parents accumulate human and physical capital in order to increase the quality of their children. Inequality arises because the learning ability of children is stochastic. Redistributive labor income taxation has a negative impact on short- and long-run growth and inequality while capital taxation increases growth without reducing inequality. I calculate a structure-induced equilibrium of the political process by means of a stochastic Simulation of the model. In the short run initial income-inequality can stimulate growth, while initial inequality of the endowment with human capital is harmfiil for growth. In the long run the economies converge to the same politico-economic equilibrium.
Monetary target announcements, reputation and hysteresis: paper presented at the EEA Ninth Annual Congress 1994, Maastricht
In: Diskussionsbeiträge
In: Serie 2 222
Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socio-economic equilibrium model
A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm which conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment of an individual determines whether she gains from a social norm. The evolution of norms is examined in a dynamic model where norms are more likely to persist if they deliver higher utility to their believers. Also it is assumed that norms lose importance when they are disobeyed by their believers. Optimally coordinating norms are not necessarily evolutionarily stable and a suboptimal norm can be the outcome of the evolutionary process.