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"Rational choice theory has become the basis for much of the recent work done in political science. And yet explanations of much political phenomena eludes rational choice theorists. Robert Grafstein offers a modification to rational choice theory that extends its ability to explain social behavior. Grafstein argues that, instead of basing the analysis on the assumption that an actor will maximise her expected utility or her utility given the probability that the event will happen, we should define rationality as the maximisation of expected utility conditional on the probability that her act will bring the event about. This definition of utility, based on the work of Richard Jeffrey, restores the consequences of an individual's act to rational choice analysis. For example, in making a decision to vote, a conditional expected utility maximiser will compare the likelihood of victory for her preferred candidate given her own participation with the likelihood of a victory given her abstention."--Jacket

Grafstein offers critiques of the conventional arguments, challenging their view that institutions are human creations automatically reformed or replaced as society's beliefs and preferences dictate. He argues that institutions are distinct physical entities not subject to human authorization. --vendor description

Nearly all modern public pension programs involve a substantial transfer of wealth from workers to retirees. If parents love their children, why are these intergenerational transfers politically sustainable? This paper develops a cross-national overlapping generations model to explore the impact of income mobility on the way workers and retirees calculate the long-term value of these programs to their children. Mobility affects their evaluations because these programs also redistribute intragenerationally. The analysis shows why a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can insist on the preservation of current public pension benefits for themselves but accept a future reduction. Implications of this explanation are tested using comparative intergenerational mobility data and a 2001 Eurobarometer survey on pensions.

This article investigates why predominantly self-interested voters exhibit weak pocketbook voting. Focusing on the USA, it estimates partisan government's impact on household income and, based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis, models the conversion of that income into consumption, the source of voters' utility in the model. The analysis implies that pocketbook voting is weak because anticipated policy is already incorporated in household consumption plans. Sociotropic variables are more powerful because they determine the relative value of partisan policies in the longer term. Using PSID data, estimates of the US parties' impact on income generate a measure of partisan utility differences. This measure enters into a probit analysis using 1952—2000 ANES presidential election data. The pocketbook measure performs as predicted both independently and in relation to sociotropic variables.

The U.S. Social Security program has irrevocably transferred substantial wealth from workers to their ostensibly altruistic parents. After some alternative explanations for this paradox are addressed, a formal model is developed to show that a majority of rational voters who care about their descendants can support the preservation of current benefits for themselves but accept the prospect of Social Security's future retrenchment. Incorporating elements of Tabellini's (2000) positive theory of Social Security and Bénabou and Ok's (2001) analysis of income mobility, the model identifies specific forces affecting this time‐varying individual support for Social Security. These forces are embodied in three hypotheses related to income mobility, relative income level, and age. An ordered logit analysis of cumulative ANES data supports these hypotheses.

This article investigates why predominantly self-interested voters exhibit weak pocketbook voting. Focusing on the USA, it estimates partisan government's impact on household income and, based on the Permanent Income Hypothesis, models the conversion of that income into consumption, the source of voters' utility in the model. The analysis implies that pocketbook voting is weak because anticipated policy is already incorporated in household consumption plans. Sociotropic variables are more powerful because they determine the relative value of partisan policies in the longer term. Using PSID data, estimates of the US parties' impact on income generate a measure of partisan utility differences. This measure enters into a probit analysis using 1952-2000 ANES presidential election data. The pocketbook measure performs as predicted both independently and in relation to sociotropic variables. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This note uncovers a serious flaw in Abramson et al's (1992) influential application of expected utility theory to the study of strategic voting in US presidential primaries. Due to this flaw, it is not clear what theory their positive empirical results actually support. Rather than dismissing their findings as anomalous or simply as disconfirming expected utility theory, this note uses conditional expected utility theory, a basic revision of the standard approach to voting, to explain these & other results related to primaries. 2 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.