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'Transforming International Institutions' illuminates how a slow, quiet, subterranean process can produce big, radical, change in international institutions and organisations. Drawing on historical institutionalism and interpretive tools of international law, Graham provides a novel theory of uncoordinated change over time.

AbstractThis article considers how trends in financing are changing governance at intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Over the course of the twentieth century IGO funding rules changed in two important ways. First, they were altered to allow states greater control over the financial contributions they provide, allowing states to 'earmark' contributions. Second, funding rules made private actors eligible contributors, providing an important entry point for private actor influence. I focus on three primary effects of these changes on IGO governance: (1) how the increased reliance on earmarked contributions undermines traditional conceptions of multilateral governance; (2) how private actors are empowered by their ability to earmark resources as they emerge as major funders; and (3) on the surge in 'minilateral' governance associated with the rise of pooled funding mechanisms. I draw on delegation theory to illustrate these changes conceptually and provide examples from a wide variety of institutions within and outside the UN system. I conclude by outlining fruitful avenues for research on financing IGOs.

What explains the design and development of funding rules at international organizations? I investigate this question in the context of the United Nations system, which has undergone a dramatic shift in financing. Long associated with mandatory contributions, the United Nations increasingly relies on voluntary resources earmarked by individual donors. Previous studies have investigated the financing puzzle from a behavioral perspective and have found that wealthy donors use voluntary funding to rein in costs and constrain international organization programs. Providing an alternative theoretical approach, I investigate the financing puzzle from an institutional design perspective. I provide original United Nations funding rule data to demonstrate that it is not only funding practices, but also underlying funding rules, that have changed over time. I theorize how states with favorable views of the United Nations that sought to expand its activities — rather than those that desired to constrain it — had incentives to introduce funding rules that offered more flexibility and control to donors. I test the argument with a longitudinal case study of funding rule design and change at United Nations economic development institutions. The article expands the institutional design literature by integrating funding rules as a consequential design component and provides a novel explanation for changes in United Nations financing.

AbstractContemporary global governance architecture has been described as fragmented, incoherent, and inefficient. The mandates of prominent international organizations (IOs) often overlap and coordination is regarded more as the exception than the rule. In this context, international institutions designed with an explicit coordination mandate hold significant promise. These assembled institutions (AIs), like the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and UNAIDS, formally incorporate IOs in their designs and seek to coordinate and bring coherence to their work in a given issue area. Although praised for their bold and innovative designs, little scholarly work has assessed the success of these institutions in fulfilling coordination mandates. The paper introduces AIs as an organizational form and sheds light on two challenges they face that provide barriers to coordination. First, concerns regarding status and material losses may cause relevant IOs to resist coordination despite ostensibly opting in to participate in the assembled institution. Second, the governing bodies of assembled institutions are weak relative to the prominent IOs incorporated in their designs. The home governing bodies of these institutions often do little to reinforce the importance of coordination, hampering performance. These challenges are illustrated in the case of the GEF and UNAIDS.

International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute different modes of governance. While mandatory funding rules are easily reconciled with traditional conceptions of multilateralism, voluntary rules are not. In particular, restricted voluntary funding rules devolve authority over funding decisions to individual actors, undercutting the collective decision making that is central to multilateral governance. I demonstrate the relevance of the argument in the case of the United Nations, which has transformed from an institution reliant primarily on mandatory contributions, to one disproportionately reliant on restricted, voluntary funds. The counterintuitive result is an increasingly bilateral United Nations. The paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between multilateralism and IO governance, and has implications for literature related to institutional design, delegation, and development aid. In addition, it raises empirical and normative questions regarding reliance on voluntary funding.

What factors influence the faithfulness of international organizations (IOs) to mandates assigned to them by member states? Although recent literature treats international organization agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influence agent faithfulness. When we conceive of international organization bureaucracies as collective agents - those including more than one bureaucratic actor and subject to internal fragmentation - international organization faithfulness can be more fully explained. Specifically, fragmentation limits faithfulness by inhibiting the effectiveness of principals' control mechanisms (i.e. oversight and agent screening and sanctioning). These arguments are illustrated using a case study of the World Health Organization and its efforts to improve health systems between 1982 and 2008. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

What factors influence the faithfulness of international organizations (IOs) to mandates assigned to them by member states? Although recent literature treats international organization agents as autonomous actors in global politics, most work continues to treat the bureaucracy of an international organization as a unitary actor. I argue that the unitary actor assumption limits our ability to assess how internal factors such as fragmentation influence agent faithfulness. When we conceive of international organization bureaucracies as collective agents — those including more than one bureaucratic actor and subject to internal fragmentation — international organization faithfulness can be more fully explained. Specifically, fragmentation limits faithfulness by inhibiting the effectiveness of principals' control mechanisms (i.e. oversight and agent screening and sanctioning). These arguments are illustrated using a case study of the World Health Organization and its efforts to improve health systems between 1982 and 2008.

AbstractHow do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used—are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states' perspective. Whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality, or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power, govern voting and representation rights at the IO. Focusing on the domain of climate finance, we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions (ICFIs) associated with multilateral development banks, but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at ICFIs within the United Nations system where egalitarian norms are strong. In this way, powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies. In addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at IOs, our framework offers insight into forum-shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas.