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ARTICLE ANALYZES RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN CASES RELATING TO THE SIZE AND UNANIMITY OF JURIES AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE (AND ABUSE) OF SOCIAL SCIENCE BY THE COURT IN THE REALM OF POLICY ANALYSIS. FOUR CASES REVIEWED "CAST AN UNFLATTERING LIGHT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S ABILITY TO INTEGRATE SOCIAL SCIENCE FINDINGS INTO PUBLIC LAW."

THE AUTHOR REVIEWS THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST MULTI - MEMBER DISTRICTS AND AT - LARGE ELECTIONS AND TRACES THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTEMPTS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF WHEN NONSINGLE - MEMBER DISTRICT ELECTIONS VIOLATE 'ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE' STANDARDS. HE ALSO REVIEWS THE AMERICAN HISTORY OF WEIGHTED, CUMULATIVE AND SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTING.

THIS PAPER IDENTIFIES THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN UNDER THE USE OF THE BANZHAF INDEX FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK WEIGHTED VOTING IN MANY COUNTIES FOR COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS: DOMINATION BY A SMALL NUMBER OF UNITS; DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING THE POWER INDEX; REDUNDANCY OF THE INDEX; ANOMALIES OF NOT APPLYING THE INDEX TO MULTIMEMBER SYSTEMS; THE MANY-SIDED ROLE OF A LEGISLATOR.

Discusses potential pitfalls in drawing conclusions from multivariate analysis of voting patterns as it relates to testimony offered in voting rights cases about the presence or absence of racially polarized voting. The methodological issues discussed are of broader relevance to deciding what statistical techniques are appropriate for descriptive as opposed to explanatory purposes. (Abstract amended)

Though few voters appear to hold consistent ideological views, the roll call votes of congressmen & senators can be well predicted by ideological terms. An explanation for this puzzle is that ideology allows candidates to succintly explain their views. Because it is difficult to explain detailed positions to voters, a candidate who presents his position in ideological terms may be able to defeat a candidate who supports a set of issue positions that would, in toto, be preferred by a majority of well-informed voters were the voters aware of all the views of that candidate. This effect can be a powerful one. Moreover, ideology may be a source of electoral stability, & a means of providing regularity & structure to elite political debate. 1 Figure, 30 References. HA

ONE APPROACH TO AVOIDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARROW'S PARADOX IS TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON THE PREFERENCES OF VOTERS. A RESTRICTION OFTEN ASSUMED IN THE LITERATURE IS THAT VOTERS' PREFERENCES CAN BE REPRESENTED BY A CHOICE AMONG POINTS IN A SPACE, WHERE VOTERS' PREFERENCES ARE CONVEX. THE AUTHOR CLAIM THAT THESE ASSUMPTIONS WILL OFTEN BE UNJUSTIFIED. GOVERNMENT MUST OFTEN ADDRESS ISSUES OF EXTERNALITIES OR PUBLIC GOODS, WHICH MEANS THAT THE POSSIBILITY FRONTIER WILL NOT BE CONCAVE. THIS IN TURN MEANS THAT VOTERS' PREFERENCES OVER FEASIBLE POLICIES WILL NOT BE CONVEX.

Measures of electoral system disproportionality and of party system volatility (as well as malapportionment and vote splitting) present similar statistical issues in terms of deciding what index is most appropriate, but it is not common to view indices of disproportionality and volatility as serving similar ends. Making use of 12 different criteria, we evaluate 19 indices that have been previously proposed as measures of either disproportionality of electoral seats-votes results or over-time volatility of party vote (or seat) shares. We suggest that, on balance, Gallagher's (1991) index, which has achieved increasing acceptance in the seats-votes literature on disproportionality (see esp. Lijphart, 1994) offers the most desirable combination of features, although the advantages it offers over the Loosemore-Hanby index are not large and are debatable. We also find that Dalton's principle of transfers presents an ambiguity when one party has a larger number of excess seats, while another has a larger proportion of them.

We propose a rational choice model of premature cabinet termination involving considerations of expected gain in terms of electoral payoffs, policy payoffs, or portfolio payoffs. This approach, which distinguishes contextual variables that will generally affect the nature of cost-benifit calculations made by political actors from the factors that are most likely to have a direct impact on a particular decision to precipitate a cabinet crisis, leads us to several testable hypotheses. We provide a first illustrative test of our predictions with data from the Netherlands. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)

THE AUTHORS ANALYZE 36 ELECTIONS HELD BY UNIONS, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND. THEY SHOW THAT THESE ELECTIONS MANIFEST A REMARKABLY HIGH DEGREE OF TRANSITIVITY, WITH A CONDORCET (MAJORITY) WINNER ALWAYS FOUND. MOREOVER, ORDERING ALTERNATIVES ACCORDING TO THEIR BORDA SCORE PROVIDES A TRANSITIVE MAJORITY ORDERING IN NEARLY ALL INSTANCES.