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THE WARSAW PACT HAS DEVELOPED INTO A VITAL IF COMPLEX INSTRUMENT FOR MANAGEMENT OF SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN POLITICALMILITARY RELATIONS. WHILE MOSCOW HAS TRIED - WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS - TO USE THE PACT FOR ITS OWN ENDS, THE EAST EUROPEANS HAVE ATTEMPTED - AT TIMES SUCCESSFULLY - TO USE IT TO WEAKEN THE SOVIET HOLD OVER THEM.

The recent transformations in the USSR are nowhere more evident than in the Soviet military. Top-level military officers have been relieved of their positions, Gorbachev has warned of lean times for the military, the symbolic role of the armed forces has been downgraded, and the concept of ""military sufficiency"" points to major modifications in Soviet force structure. Contrary to some who see Gorbachev as a Sir Galahad out to slay the evil military high command, Dale Herspring concludes that the relationship between the highest Soviet political and military leaders is at the moment more s

Putin's leadership / Richard Sawka -- Putin and the attenuation of Russian democracy / Timothy J. Colton -- Putin, the Duma, and political parties / Thomas F. Remington -- Putin and the regions / Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider -- Putin and the law / Kathryn Hendley -- Putin and the economy / James R. Millar -- Putin and agriculture / Stephen K. Wegren -- Putin and the armed forces / Dale R. Herspring -- Putin and foreign policy / Andrei P. Tsygankov -- Conclusion / Dale R. Herspring

How to deal with the gradual movement toward detente in Europe has been one of the most troublesome problems facing East German leaders in recent years. Few areas exist where concern over problems associated with a relaxation of tensions has been more apparent than in the SED's (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or Socialist Unity Party) handling of the NVA (Nationale Volksarmee or National People's Army).

The key problem in civil‐military relations in established polities such as Russia and the United States is not civilian control of the military, but rather how to create a symbiotic relationship of "shared responsibility" between senior military officers and civilian leaders. In such a situation, civilian leaders obtain much needed expertise from the military, but ultimately remain in control. The keys to symbiotic civil‐military relations are a desire on the part of military officers to work with civilians and civilian respect for military culture. When civilians respect military culture—that is, the military's (1) devotion to clear executive leadership, (2) commitment to corporate identity, (3) drive to increase professional expertise, and (4) dedication to political responsibility—a system of shared responsibility is likely to emerge. This thesis is elaborated by comparing recent civil‐military relations in Russia and the United States.