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Investigations carried out over the course of the last decade have revealed that during much of the Cold War, Sweden espoused a Janus-like policy in which there stood an open non-alignment & neutrality doctrine alongside a secret arrangement to cooperate with Western powers in the event of a Soviet invasion or a European war. This article focuses on what is here suggested to be a series of attempts to rewrite or edit this particular phase of Swedish political history, given the incompatibility of the two stances that Sweden assumed during this period. The author treats some of the highly controversial Swedish policies concerning alignment with the West, in particular with the United States & NATO. References. C. Brunski

Developments in international relations and military doctrines after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised a number of issues related to the production, transfer and use of military technology. Part of the response to asymmetric or other threats depends on the exploitation of relevant skills in support of research, development and production; on the efficient organization of such activities at the national and multinational levels; and on sharing the outputs with friendly states and allies. Military research and development (R&D) is the most expensive and basic phase in the creation of a new weapon platform. The 'revolution in military affairs', which some see as more of a constant evolution, is a process that today is identified with 'network-centric' military solutions, of which the war in Iraq in 2003 has been called the first operational test. The Iraq war effort benefited from the breakdown of the barrier between civil and military technology in the fields of communications, information technology and sensors. There has been a shift in emphasis from traditional military R&D of defined weapon platforms towards greater military exploitation of science and technology (S&T). This is referred to as 'S&T-based military innovation', implying cooperation with as well as direct and long-term military support -- through defense ministries, armed services and related research organizations -- for basic research, applied research and exploratory technology development to achieve and support future military capabilities. The USA and the UK are examples of nations with a national S&T-based military innovation policy. Despite their differences, both policies reflect the overlap between what are considered civil and military S&T areas. In the USA the implementation of S&T-based military innovation has been standard procedure at least since World War II. The UK is a major European military producer and the one where a new emphasis on S&T-based military innovation has been most clearly demonstrated. In spite of the European Security and Defense Policy, there is no coordinated European S&T-based military innovation policy. This is partly because the inclusion of defense as an EU task is only recent and partly because of the overlapping and unclear boundaries between the pillars of the organization. Another difficulty is national competition within Europe and attempts to preserve national skills rather than pool them. However, there are changes under way that might constitute steps towards the establishment of a more coordinated European, or even EU, S&T-based military innovation policy. Should such a policy be formulated, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 may bring both S&T benefits and competitive drawbacks. It is also open to question whether European S&T will be sufficient to meet EU capability ambitions. Exploiting foreign S&T for EU military innovation would enhance national S&T-based military innovation and multinational research programs. There are three long-term implications of a shift towards EU S&T-based military innovation: for data and transparency; for research ethics; and for finding a political balance between cooperation, competition and technology controls among both friends and foes. The data and transparency problem -- a general problem in military and security studies -- is further complicated by S&T-based military innovation. The ethical problem is basically an individual problem mainly for non-military actors involved in S&T-based military innovation. The neutral aspect of S&T and the many uncertainties with regard to its potential military use will involve difficult considerations for actors, especially if transparency remains low. The problem of finding an acceptable political balance between the free sharing of S&T results and trying to gain commercial and technological advantages over military competitors -- both friends and foes -- while at the same time implementing technology transfer controls in order to prevent or delay military innovation by potential enemies is likely to become an increasingly delicate task. Adapted from the source document.

The foreign military relations of Thailand and the Philippines are analysed against a hypothesis of military dependency. Attempts by both countries to diversify their military supplies have so far not had any significant effects. Both countries are highly dependent especially upon the US. Their individual profiles differ, however. Thailand has received more US security assistance than has the Philippines. At the same time the Philippines has been financially favored by way of relatively more grant assistance and financial support. The main explanation given is that this is a way for the US to 'pay for' the base rights. This direct linkage between the US bases and assistance might be a complicating factor in the negotiations concerning the future of the bases. A 'compromise' rather than a 'refusal' policy is therefore seen as the most likely outcome for the near future after 1991 In the long run, however, several factors become important, such as the development of national and international tension, war, and the possible creation of 'cooperative forces' between the US and Third World countries. US training support might in the long run become one of the most important factors shaping future military dependency upon the US and of keeping security perceptions in these countries 'aligned' with American interpretations. This will put severe stress particularly upon those governments trying to change their defense policy away from foreign military dependency.

The strong military defense posture is perhaps the best-known attribute of the Swedish security policy. A military-industrial policy of self-sufficiency is often described as a necessary condition for the peace-time credibility of Sweden's nonaligned position & will to stay neutral in war. However, with the growing sophistication of modern weaponry, Sweden has become increasingly dependent on imported arms in order to maintain an adequate level of defense. To compensate for this potential weakness, Sweden's foreign policy has been directed at active participation in world affairs through international organizations such as the UN, the Conference for General & Complete Disarmament, & the European Security Conference. In this way, Sweden has achieved solidarity with other western nations while retaining its nonaligned status. 3 Tables, 1 Figure. Modified HA.

Through their NATO membership several West European states have been able to solve their military production problems with the aid of the USA. This solution, however, has come to be looked upon in certain quarters as more of a hindrance than a contribution to the development of Western Europe. This report describes the principal efforts made to meet the military demands in West European states by means of joint West European production. A central question is whether this co- production may be conducive to better conditions for a defence community within Western Europe. Three results of the study may be worth emphasizing. First, that it is between the four major West European states that a considerable part of the co-production has developed. Secondly, that industrial possibilities for military pro duction in Western Europe might have increased due to the coordinating agencies formed as a consequence of the co-production. Thirdly, that these coordinating agen cies may provide West European industries with better means for political pressure.

The changing security environment produces challenges for providers of quantitative indicators on the military sector. Such indicators traditionally include data on military expenditure, arms production & arms transfers. New security thinking & policies, involving the broadening & deepening of the concept of security to include non-military means & security providers other than the state, have had an impact on the relevance of data on military expenditure & other indicators for security analysis. The blurred border between the functions of the military & those of the internal security sectors also raises questions about the meaning of separate data on military spending. Also, if the internationalization of arms acquisition continues to be ignored by the methodologies for studying arms transfers, it will not be possible to describe arms markets, or changes in such markets, reliably. It is therefore important to refine the methodologies in all of these areas. Adapted from the source document.

The global downward trend in international transfers of major weapons was reversed in 2003. Since then there has been an increase in the volume of major arms transfers as reflected in the SIPRI trend-indicator value. The change is also reflected in the financial values of global arms exports according to national reporting, which is estimated at $44-53 billion, or 0.5-0.6% of world trade, in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available. The five largest suppliers in the period 2001-2005 were Russia, the USA, France, Germany and the UK, in order according to the SIPRI trend-indicator value. The combined exports from EU member states made it the third largest exporter of major conventional weapons. Russia and the USA each accounted for roughly 30% of global deliveries of major weapons. In 2005 the five largest suppliers accounted for over 80% of total deliveries. In the period 2001-2005, 43% of Russia's deliveries went to China and 25% to India. China and India have become important to arms exporters because both are in a position to become economic powers and leaders in technology applications. The USA's relations with India are today labelled 'strategic', and the US policy is to keep India and Japan strong in order to offset China's rising regional influence. While the present volume of US transfers of major weapons to India is low, the USA seems prepared to offer the country advanced weaponry, including technology transfers and co-development of weapons. The four largest recipients of US exports in 2001-2005 were Greece, Israel, the UK and Egypt, in that order. The search for new markets and the drive to maintain existing markets sharpen international competition. In some cases this supports commercial pragmatism in national implementations of export policy; that is, markets that are not subject to international embargoes are regarded as open markets. In parallel, there is evidence of political fatigue in some governments with regard to their commitment to transparency and the UN arms export reporting mechanism, the UNROCA. The UNROCA showed large discrepancies in reported data between exports and imports, and the criteria that different countries used to decide which weapons to report and how a 'transfer' is defined remain at variance. Transparency will suffer if a tendency for commercial pragmatism in national arms export policy spreads and reduces political willingness to report on national arms exports. At the same time, it remains difficult to interpret the data that are actually being reported. Adapted from the source document.

The downward trend in major arms transfers as measured by the SIPRI trend-indicator value appears to have been reversed. In both 2001 and 2003 there were clear increases in the volumes of major weapons delivered. Russia and the USA remain the major suppliers. Their main recipients were China and India (in the case of Russia) and Taiwan, Egypt, the UK, Greece, Turkey and Japan (in the case of the USA). A continued increase in US arms transfers will influence the global trend. However, domestic factors indicate that the level of Russian arms transfers is unlikely to remain high for very much longer. The future is uncertain for the other major suppliers because of international competition and remaining uncertainty about the future potential of European development and production. The relatively small suppliers of today could achieve short-term importance, as illustrated by Canada and Uzbekistan. Events in Iraq in 2003 do not seem to have had a strong immediate impact on orders for or deliveries of major weapons. They seem instead to have supported decisions already made as a result of the war in Afghanistan. The operation in Iraq may have been carried out at a technical level beyond what most countries regard as relevant to their own defense policy or military strategy. That said, there are likely to be orders for new weapons such as precision-guided 'beyond visual range' missiles, ABM defense systems, UAVs and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). Since the war in Afghanistan MANPADS have been high on the international control agenda, but they may be in demand because they were among the more effective weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq. (1) Appendices 12A and 12B provide data on the transfers of major conventional weapons. (2) Appendix 12C explains the sources and methods for the data collection. (3) Appendix 12D, by Siemon T. Wezeman, discusses the suppliers of ballistic missiles. The proliferation of ballistic missiles has been viewed by Western countries as a problem for over 20 years. Several of the major and most problematic suppliers and recipients, such as China, Iran, North Korea and Syria, are among the most secretive countries in the world. Most reports of their activities are based on Israeli, United States or other Western intelligence sources and are virtually impossible to verify. North Korean export-related income is very limited and arms sales provide an important part of it. Most North Korean weapons are outdated and uncompetitive, but the country has found a niche-market for its ballistic missiles. Giving up such exports, which are not illegal, would be a large economic sacrifice. Companies and persons from former Soviet republics are trading their products and knowledge for commercial reasons, but generally without state involvement or permission. Other exporters' reasons may be more political. Chinese technology exports to Pakistan are more related to supporting an ally, as are US exports to the United Kingdom. There may be steps in the direction of the development of very accurate ballistic missiles that could use conventional warheads more effectively. New navigation systems may dramatically improve accuracy without adding exceptional additional costs. GPS technology is widespread and other systems not dependent on signals from foreign satellites are also possible. However, the main urgency in the debate about missile proliferation arises from those missiles intended to deliver warheads armed with biological, chemical or nuclear payloads, especially nuclear warheads. There has been some success in limiting the number of suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology. This is partly linked to the fact that ballistic missiles -- especially when they have ranges of over 1500 km, when problems of multiple stages and warhead re-entry are encountered -- are fairly complicated systems which often require foreign help. That many of the key technologies required for ballistic missiles (e.g., fuel, warhead re-entry vehicles and engines) are quite distinct has also helped to control proliferation. Importantly, some of the uncertainty about ballistic missile programs, transfers and links between countries may soon be reduced. The 'war on terrorism' has increased controls on financial transactions and on the transfer and transportation of weapons and related materials. Revelations about and Western access to the Libyan and Iraqi ballistic missile programs will increase understanding of the sources and mechanisms of ballistic missile proliferation. This may lead to improved controls and regulations, further limiting proliferation. Adapted from the source document.

Transfers of major conventional weapons in the period 1998-2002 remained at a low & relatively stable post-Cold War level. The five largest suppliers accounted for about 80% of all major conventional arms transfers. The US was the largest supplier in the five-year period, although Russia was the largest supplier in 2002. The People's Republic of China's move to fourth place in 2002 was a significant rise from previous years. Among the major recipients were countries involved in the war against terrorism. The cases studied suggest that antiterrorism did not result in high levels of major arms deliveries in 2002. The importance of antiterrorist activities for the future trend in transfers of major weapons is unclear. Nonetheless, even low-level & ad hoc transfers of major weapons could become important for smaller suppliers & make a substantial contribution to the military capability of particular recipients. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 3 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.