Search results

One consequence of armed conflict, especially that of a non-international character, is serious damage done to vital societal infrastructure. Education–schools and universities–can be severely disrupted, even subject to attack. Targeting of schools may not invariably be unlawful if educational facilities are being put to military use. Such use may itself not be unlawful but it can result in schools being transformed from civilian objects into military objectives–and subject, therefore, to lawful targeting. This was a problem highlighted by humanitarian NGOs a decade ago and led to the formation, by both NGOs and United Nations agencies, of the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA). In considering ways of reducing the vulnerability of schools, universities and the students and staff present within them, GCPEA decided to develop a set of "soft law" guidelines on the military use of education, the aim being to assist with Law of Armed Conflict compliance but also to encourage armed forces and armed non-state actors to act well within the limits of the law. The resulting Guidelines were drafted in 2012-13, published in 2013, began being championed by Norway and Argentina in 2014, and were launched at State level within a Safe Schools Declaration in 2015. They have now been endorsed by 106 States and there is evidence now emerging of their positive influence on behavior in conflict zones. The Guidelines are a good example of a successful "soft law" initiative and this paper provides an account of their development and advocacy.

AbstractWhile most law on the conduct of hostilities has been heavily scrutinized in recent years, the law dealing with armed conflict at sea has been largely ignored. This is not surprising. There have been few naval conflicts since 1945, and those that have occurred have been limited in scale; none has involved combat between major maritime powers. Nevertheless, navies have tripled in number since then, and today there are growing tensions between significant naval powers. There is a risk of conflict at sea. Conditions have changed since 1945, but the law has not developed in that time. Elements of it, especially that regulating economic warfare at sea, seem outdated and it is not clear that the law is well placed to regulate so-called "hybrid" warfare at sea. It seems timely to review the law, to confirm that which is appropriate and to develop that which is not. Perhaps a new edition of the San Remo Manual would be timely.

This article places 1907 Hague Convention VIII in its historical context, examines its content, summarizes State practice since 1907 (including during the two World Wars) and discusses the Convention's relevance to contemporary mine warfare. The Convention has inherent shortcomings, has never been strictly applicable in any war since 1907, and is not strictly relevant to anything other than automatic contact mines (effectively excluding modern influence mines). Despite this—and a paucity of substantial State practice since 1945—the conclusion is that the Convention has influenced the customary law on sea-mines. When that custom was combined with other relevant custom (particularly that pertaining to the peacetime law of the sea) during the San Remo Manual process, the result was an extremely useful guide to what would probably be acceptable in relation to mine warfare. There is now evidence that the San Remo Manual mine warfare articles are themselves becoming accepted as custom.