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"What explains the dramatic rise of the extreme, ultranationalist Golden Dawn in a country that has experienced Nazi invasion and a military dictatorship? This book places the rise of the Golden Dawn in the context of the Eurozone crisis and argues that its rise is not merely the product of economic malaise. Rather, the success of the Golden Dawn is dependent on the extent to which it was able to propound plausible solutions to the three sets of crises--economic, political and ideological--that culminated in an overall crisis of the nation-state and democracy in Greece. Within this context, the authors examine the Golden Dawn's strategic response to the crisis in terms of the offering of a "nationalist solution" through the employment of the twin fascist myths of social decadence and national rebirth in its discourse. It is through these two myths that the Golden Dawn promises the disillusioned an escape from their social, economic and overall human desolation"--

Why has the extreme right Greek Golden Dawn, a party with clear links to fascism, experienced a rise defying all theories that claim that such a party is unlikely to win in post-Second World War Europe? And, if we accept that economic crisis is an explanation for this, why has such a phenomenon not occurred in other countries that have similar conducive conditions, such as Portugal and Spain? This article addresses this puzzle by: (1) carrying out a controlled comparison of Greece, Portugal and Spain; and (2) showing that the rise of the extreme right is not a question of intensity of economic crisis. Rather it is the nature of the crisis – that is, economic versus overall crisis of democratic representation – that facilitates the rise of the extreme right. We argue that extreme right parties are more likely to experience an increase in their support when economic crisis culminates into an overall crisis of democratic representation. Economic crisis is likely to become a political crisis when severe issues of governability impact upon the ability of the state to fulfil its social contract obligations. This breach of the social contract is accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institutions, resulting in party system collapse.

"Does the economy affect patterns of far-right party support across countries? This article reconceptualizes micro-level analyses that focus on the effect of unemployment through a framework of costs, risks and the mediating role of labour market institutions. It then derives several hypotheses and tests them on the results of the previous three EP elections in all EU Member States. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far-right party support at the national level. By contrast, labour market institutions influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far-right party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far-right party support in some European countries that experienced the severity of the 2008 eurozone crisis." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

AbstractDoes the economy affect patterns of far‐right party support across countries? This article reconceptualizes micro‐level analyses that focus on the effect of unemployment through a framework of costs, risks and the mediating role of labour market institutions. It then derives several hypotheses and tests them on the results of the previous three EP elections in all EU Member States. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far‐right party support at the national level. By contrast, labour market institutions influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far‐right party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far‐right party support in some European countries that experienced the severity of the 2008 eurozone crisis.

AbstractWhile the 2014 European Parliament elections were marked by the rise of parties on the far right‐wing, the different patterns of support that we observe across Europe and across time are not directly related to the economic crisis. Indeed, economic hardship seems neither sufficient nor necessary for the rise of such parties to occur. Using the cross‐national results for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections in order to capture time and country variations, we posit that the economy affects the rise of far right‐wing parties in more complex ways. Specifically, we compare the experience of high‐debt countries (the 'debtors') and the others (the 'creditors') and explore the relationship between far right‐wing party success on the one hand, and unemployment, inequality, immigration, globalisation and the welfare state on the other. Our discussion suggests there might be a trade‐off between budgetary stability and far right‐wing party support, but the choice between Charybdis and Scylla may be avoided if policy‐makers carefully choose which policies should bear the brunt of the fiscal adjustment.