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Based on the idea of Scott Sagan and others, this series of articles examine the proposition that America never initiate nuclear weapons use. By not initiating such use, it is believed that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons may be furthered. However, there are areas of the globe where such avoidance would hinder the US weaker, as conventional weaponry and forces would be impotent, such as in the Taiwan Strait. In this pursuit, considers such political goals as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and US ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, as well as a suggested presidential declaration attesting to the reasons for America's continued storage of nuclear weapons. Other issues involve questions of trust of governments like those of North Korea and Iran. If these nations utilize nuclear weapons it may force the US to reciprocate in kind. In anticipation of this, the US and other nations have implemented 'calculated ambiguity' into their treaties and policies, part of which questions the possible use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to chemical or biological weapons use. Yet at least one of the articles finds doubt in the idea that no first strike against a non-nuclear state can actually prevent an attack on the US or its allies. Also, for the world to stand down from use of nuclear weapons, the United States must de-emphasize nuclear weapons as a facet of its operational strategy. Concludes with a new article by Professor Sagan answering questions of his supporters and detractors. Adapted from the source document.

Why did the Johnson Administration decide in the late 1960's to deploy a ballistic missile defense system in the United States? In attempting to answer this question we need to seek an understanding of several distinct decisions and actions. The most puzzling event occurred in San Francisco on September 18, 1967, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered an address to the editors and publishers of United Press International. McNamara devoted the first fourteen pages of his talk to a general discussion of the strategic arms race, emphasizing the limited utility of nuclear weapons and the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had gained any increased security from the arms race. With this as background, he turned to a specific discussion of the ABM issue

Three military groups with different interests will influence decisions regarding war termination. Each will believe that it is advocating what is in the national interest but will view it from a different perspective. The field com mander will believe that his theater is of central importance and that military victory is possible. The military services will be concerned about their continuing autonomy and growth and will evaluate proposals for war termination from this per spective. The general staff in the nation's capital will be sensitive to domestic and foreign political considerations and will view their mission as compromising between civilian and field commander views.