Search results

The PCWP agenda has contributed a great deal to the discipline of world politics, empirically, methodologically and theoretically. However, there is scope to expand upon certain aspects of this body of scholarship. In particular, the agenda is developing some unfortunate hierarchies in its focus on high-budget 'blockbusters' at the expense of data from the everyday. It is displaying a lack of imagination in terms of its methodologies and forms of output, despite the aesthetic and creative nature of many of the artefacts. Finally, it is evincing a reluctance to explore representations beyond the textual or the visual, at the expense of other forms of representation, including sound, taste or, as I argue in this paper, artefactuality.

Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Lord Barham's Admiralty: 1805; 2. Admiralty reform, 1806-1835; 3. Decision-making at the Admiralty, c.1806-1830; 4. Admiralty administration and decision-making, c.1830-1868. The Graham Admiralty; 5. The Admiralty reformed again: context and problems, 1869-1885; 6. Administrative and policy-making responses, c.1882 onwards; 7. Fisher and Churchill, and their successors, 1902-1917; 8. The Naval Staff, planning and policy; 9. Lord Beatty's Admiralty; Conclusion

The international war on drugs has been roundly criticised by drug reformers as economically costly, ineffective and catastrophic for human rights and communities. This essay reflects on some of the interconnections between the war on drugs' attacks on vulnerable people and environments, and the vulnerability of other species. I argue that ending the war on drugs is an animal justice issue due to the direct and indirect (but not unforeseeable) impacts of 'narco' economics and militarised responses to the production and distribution of illegal drugs.

In the early nineteenth-century Admiralty there was little policy-making, policy-makers were few and the word 'policy' was scarcely ever used. At least in peacetime, economy was the default principle of action. Only by a century later had something approximating the modern pattern emerged. The growth from the 1880s of better internal Admiralty financial control was an important causal factor. It sponsored the development of a bureaucratic organization concerned with financial policy-making, anticipating here the similar development in the planning of naval strategy and construction. Moreover, it encouraged Admiralty civil servants to involve themselves in wider matters of policy. Also relevant are attempts made by the Treasury, principally between the two world wars, to enforce more external financial controls, though these were against the background of fundamental defence problems that themselves greatly aided the concentration of minds.