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I examine excise taxes levied on multiproduct retailers. Excise taxes reduce equilibrium output and decrease equilibrium product variety in the short run, but taxes can raise output per product in the long run and induce entry. Excise taxes are overshifted into prices in a wide range of cases, including under linear and concave demand conditions, and excise taxes shift less than one-for-one into prices only when demand is highly convex. Multiproduct transactions substantively alter the efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes and affect the comparison of relative tax performance over short-run and long-run time horizons. (JEL H25, H32, L11, L13, L81)

This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below‐cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail pricing of a supermarket's private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider seeks to control the retail pricing of an in‐store composite consumption good.

This book gives students and practitioners in development psychology access to current theory and research along with illustrations of good practice. The main section is organized around the contexts in which adolescents grow up.The next section addresses evaluation, funding, and community-wide initiatives. The concluding chapter identifies multidisciplinary themes