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The institution of bicameralism, as a distinct constitutional element, is examined. Bicameralism exerts a stabilizing effect on legislatures by supporting a non-empty core in majority voting games. This effect was originally established for two-dimensional policy spaces & extends to the n-dimensional case. The mechanism by which bicameralism generates a core of potentially stable equilibria is the institutionalization of opposition between mutually oriented median voters. Multicameralism may generate the same stabilizing effect, but only under conditions of substantial opposition between chambers. The linkage of this analysis of bicameralism with the standard median voter model & with more traditional analyses of bicameralism is discussed. 3 Figures, 8 References. Adapted from the source document.

Jan-Werner Müller provides a four-dimensional framework for comprehending conservatism as a political ideology. We focus on conservatism as a political philosophy, rather than an ideology, and provide more detailed analysis in order to re-assess Müller'

We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested motivations in the in-period context to relatively general-interest decision making in the constitutional context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to relate to essentially political settings where decision making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions that are insulated from popular voting.

An essential feature of political representation is that a mediating assembly is set between the citizenry and political decision making. Representation involves indirect decision making or agency. Rational actor political theory often assumes representation in order to focus on problems of a principal-agent kind, but offers only relatively weak arguments for representation. We offer an alternative argument for representation that builds on our broader interpretation of rational actor political theory - an interpretation that emphasizes expressive considerations relative to instrumental considerations, and operates in a richer motivational setting. As well as providing an account of representation, we believe that our approach is capable of re-connecting rational actor political theory to many of the concerns of more traditional political theory.

Jan-Werner Müller provides a four-dimensional framework for comprehending conservatism as a political ideology. We focus on conservatism as a political philosophy, rather than an ideology, and provide more detailed analysis in order to re-assess Müller'

An essential feature of political representation is that a mediating assembly is set between the citizenry and political decision making. Representation involves indirect decision making or agency. Rational actor political theory often assumes representation in order to focus on problems of a principal-agent kind, but offers only relatively weak arguments for representation. We offer an alternative argument for representation that builds on our broader interpretation of rational actor political theory - an interpretation that emphasizes expressive considerations relative to instrumental considerations, and operates in a richer motivational setting. As well as providing an account of representation, we believe that our approach is capable of re-connecting rational actor political theory to many of the concerns of more traditional political theory.

We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested motivations in the in-period context to relatively general-interest decision making in the constitutional context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to relate to essentially political settings where decision making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions that are insulated from popular voting.