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This is the first book to provide comprehensive coverage of the full range of philosophical writing in Britain in the eighteenth century. A team of experts provides new accounts of both major and lesser-known thinkers, and explores the diverse approaches in the period to logic and metaphysics, the passions, morality, criticism, and politics.

James Beattie (1735-1803) was appointed professor of moral philosophy and logic at Marischal College, Aberdeen, Scotland at the age of twenty-five. Though more fond of poetry than philosophy, he became part of the Scottish 'Common Sense' school of philosophy that included Thomas Reid and George Campbell. In 1770 Beattie published the work for which he is best known, An Essay on Truth, an abrasive attack on 'modern scepticism' in general, and on David Hume in particular, subsequently and desp

Abstract
In the early iterations of his political thought, The Elements of Law and De Cive, Hobbes proposed a new account of the nature of the people. In Section 2 I describe Pufendorf's critical response. Pufendorf's theory of the people is a neglected aspect of the political argument of the De Jure. Just as neglected is Locke's theory of the people in Two Treatises of Government, though there is better reason for neglect in Locke's case, in so far as he fails in his major work of political philosophy to present anything resembling a theory of the people at all. In Section 3 I bring Locke's thinking about the people into clearer focus. In the concluding Section 4 I explore some of the weaknesses of his position.

I argue that one of John Locke's intentions in writing Two Treatises of Government was to turn the tables on Sir Robert Filmer and his followers when it came to the question of practical consequences of writing and publishing political philosophy. According to Locke, it was Filmer's thesis of natural subjection that had seditious ramifications. The doctrine of natural liberty and equality, by contrast, was no threat to the peace and order of a well-governed state. I show first that Locke is correct in his claim that in Patriarcha Filmer is, by his own admission and according to the logic of his own argument, a theorist of de factopolitical power. This meant, according to Locke, that Filmer has no account of the moral basis of allegiance. To that extent, Filmer has no case to make against the usurper. On other hand, I then argue, there is evidence in the Second Treatise that Locke was attuned to the worries that Filmer raises about the consequences of the thesis of natural liberty. Locke sought, in a number of ways, to contain the potentially destabilizing implications of his own conclusions. In conclusion I make a tentative suggestion as to how this concern with the practical consequences of flawed political theory might explain Locke's decision to publish both of the two Treatises in 1689.

I argue that one of John Locke's intentions in writing Two Treatises of Government was to turn the tables on Sir Robert Filmer and his followers when it came to the question of practical consequences of writing and publishing political philosophy. According to Locke, it was Filmer's thesis of natural subjection that had seditious ramifications. The doctrine of natural liberty and equality, by contrast, was no threat to the peace and order of a well-governed state. I show first that Locke is correct in his claim that in Patriarcha Filmer is, by his own admission and according to the logic of his own argument, a theorist of de factopolitical power. This meant, according to Locke, that Filmer has no account of the moral basis of allegiance. To that extent, Filmer has no case to make against the usurper. On other hand, I then argue, there is evidence in the Second Treatise that Locke was attuned to the worries that Filmer raises about the consequences of the thesis of natural liberty. Locke sought, in a number of ways, to contain the potentially destabilizing implications of his own conclusions. In conclusion I make a tentative suggestion as to how this concern with the practical consequences of flawed political theory might explain Locke's decision to publish both of the two Treatises in 1689. ; Publisher PDF ; Peer reviewed

AbstractMy point of departure in this essay is Smith's definition of government. "Civil government," he writes, "so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." First I unpack Smith's definition of government as the protection of the rich against the poor. I argue that, on Smith's view, this is always part of what government is for. I then turn to the question of what, according to Smith, our governors can do to protect the wealth of the rich from the resentment of the poor. I consider, and reject, the idea that Smith might conceive of education as a means of alleviating the resentment of the poor at their poverty. I then describe how, in his lectures on jurisprudence, Smith refines and develops Hume's taxonomy of the opinions upon which all government rests. The sense of allegiance to government, according to Smith, is shaped by instinctive deference to natural forms of authority as well as by rational, Whiggish considerations of utility. I argue that it is the principle of authority that provides the feelings of loyalty upon which government chiefly rests. It follows, I suggest, that to the extent that Smith looked to government to protect the property of the rich against the poor, and thereby to maintain the peace and stability of society at large, he cannot have sought to lessen the hold on ordinary people of natural sentiments of deference. In addition, I consider the implications of Smith's theory of government for the question of his general attitude toward poverty. I argue against the view that Smith has recognizably "liberal," progressive views of how the poor should be treated. Instead, I locate Smith in the political culture of the Whiggism of his day.