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How has it been possible for Irish political leaders to actively promote two of the largest challenges to Irish nation-statehood: the concession of sovereignty to the European Union and the retraction of the constitutional claim over Northern Ireland? The author of this book argues that such discourses are integrally connected and, what is more, embody the enduring relevance of nationalism in modern Ireland. As the most comprehensive study to date of official discourse in twentieth-century Ireland, this book traces the ways in which nationalism can be simultaneously redefined and revitalised th

The 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement that cemented the peace process formalized Northern Ireland's position as a region integrally connected to both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. The multilevel governance and cross-border cooperation this entailed was enabled by common UK and Irish membership of the European Union. The UK's decision to leave the EU posed risks to this settlement. In response, they engaged in a quest for 'flexible and imaginative solutions' to this conundrum. The unique arrangements established through the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement (2019) mark an innovative and ambitious development for the EU. First, it de facto includes a region of a non-member state within its internal market for goods and, second, it delegates the enforcement of its rules to that non-member state. The Protocol represents a significant departure for the EU in terms of its typical engagement with external actors. Most significantly, it will not only represent a 'live' concern for the EU but a unique type of responsibility.

AbstractThe protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland proved to be the trickiest element of the UK‐EU Withdrawal Agreement to negotiate. The version that was finally agreed to by both sides sees the EU's customs code and regulatory rules applying in Northern Ireland. In avoiding a hard border for the movement of goods on the island of Ireland, there are new frictions on the movement of goods within the United Kingdom (across the Irish Sea). Implementing the protocol is a complex practical as well as political challenge. What it means in practice is largely dependent on the nature of the UK‐EU relationship.

The protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland proved to be the trickiest element of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement to negotiate. The version that was finally agreed to by both sides sees the EU's customs code and regulatory rules applying in Northern Ireland. In avoiding a hard border for the movement of goods on the island of Ireland, there are new frictions on the movement of goods within the United Kingdom (across the Irish Sea). Implementing the protocol is a complex practical as well as political challenge. What it means in practice is largely dependent on the nature of the UK-EU relationship.

The 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement that cemented the peace process formalized Northern Ireland's position as a region integrally connected to both Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. The multilevel governance and cross-border cooperation this entailed was enabled by common UK and Irish membership of the European Union. The UK's decision to leave the EU posed risks to this settlement. In response, they engaged in a quest for 'flexible and imaginative solutions' to this conundrum. The unique arrangements established through the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement (2019) mark an innovative and ambitious development for the EU. First, it de facto includes a region of a non-member state within its internal market for goods and, second, it delegates the enforcement of its rules to that non-member state. The Protocol represents a significant departure for the EU in terms of its typical engagement with external actors. Most significantly, it will not only represent a 'live' concern for the EU but a unique type of responsibility.

The early response to the coronavirus pandemic in Northern Ireland revealed three things. First, although part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is integrally connected in very practical ways to the Republic of Ireland. Policies and practices regarding COVID-19 on the southern side of the Irish land border had a direct impact on those being formulated for the North. Secondly, as well as differences in scientific advice and political preferences in the bordering jurisdictions, a coherent policy response was delayed by leaders' failures to communicate in a timely manner with counterparts on the other side of the border. And, thirdly, different policies on either side of an open border can fuel profound uncertainty in a borderland region; but this can give rise to community-level action that fills the gaps in ways that can actually better respond to the complexity of the situation. This essay draws on the author's close observation of events as they happened, including news coverage, press conferences and public statements from the three governments concerned over the period of March-October 2020.

The early response to the coronavirus pandemic in Northern Ireland revealed three things. First, although part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is integrally connected in very practical ways to the Republic of Ireland. Policies and practices regarding COVID-19 on the southern side of the Irish land border had a direct impact on those being formulated for the North. Secondly, as well as differences in scientific advice and political preferences in the bordering jurisdictions, a coherent policy response was delayed by leaders' failures to communicate in a timely manner with counterparts on the other side of the border. And, thirdly, different policies on either side of an open border can fuel profound uncertainty in a borderland region; but this can give rise to community-level action that fills the gaps in ways that can actually better respond to the complexity of the situation. This essay draws on the author's close observation of events as they happened, including news coverage, press conferences and public statements from the three governments concerned over the period of March-October 2020.

Changing the status of the Irish border to an external boundary between the UK and the EU was always going to be difficult to manage. Both the UK and the EU shared the objective of avoiding a hard border but finding the means of doing so proved to be a complex technical and diplomatic challenge. Whilst the withdrawal negotiations continued, concerns grew among those who would be most directly affected. Despite a history of conflict and underdevelopment, the Irish border region had become one of the most successfully integrated in the world. This only increased the potential price to be paid for Brexit by those living and working there. Successful cross-border development depends on the conditions for, and habits of, cooperation fostered 'on the ground'. The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the Withdrawal Agreement brings some assurance about maintaining the conditions of north/south cooperation. Nonetheless, the UK/EU border problem that falls on Northern Ireland will persist as a topic in perpetual need of political sensitivity and accommodation.

AbstractThe experience of the 2019 general election in Northern Ireland took a very different course to that of the rest of the UK and, indeed, to the pattern of electoral politics typical of the region. Coming after almost three years with no functioning devolved government, combined with intense disagreement and uncertainty about Brexit, voters were ready to give a message to the two largest parties. Both Sinn Féin and the DUP suffered losses in the election, with the headline outcome being that unionism no longer holds the majority of seats for Northern Ireland in Westminster. More generally, there was a swing from both sides towards centre ground voting, which brought significant gains for the Alliance Party and the SDLP. This article summarises the reasons for this broad trend, focussing on the conditions and electoral pacts which brought it about. It also considers what it might mean for the prospects for Irish unification, noting that a referendum on unification will only be passed by attracting votes from those who tend to see themselves as neither unionist or nationalist.