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This book argues that alien rule can become legitimate to the degree that it provides governance that is both effective and fair. Governance is effective to the degree that citizens have access to an expanding economy and an ample supply of culturally appropriate collective goods. Governance is fair to the degree that rulers act according to the strictures of procedural justice. These twin conditions help account for the legitimation of alien rulers in organizations of markedly different scale. The book applies these principles to the legitimation of alien rulers in states (the Republic of Genoa, nineteenth- and twentieth-century China, and modern Iraq), colonies (Taiwan and Korea under Japanese rule), and occupation regimes, as well as in less encompassing organizations such as universities (academic receivership), corporations (mergers and acquisitions), and stepfamilies. Finally, it speculates about the possibility of an international market in governance services

Social scientists have long recognized that solidarity is essential for such phenomena as social order, class, and ethnic consciousness, and the provision of collective goods. In presenting a new general theory of group solidarity, Michael Hechter here contends that it is indeed possible to build a theory of solidarity based on the action of rational individuals and in doing so he goes beyond the timeworn disciplinary boundaries separating the various social sciences

A theory of group solidarity / by Michael Hechter -- Determinants of group cohesion in contemporary Japan / by Mary C. Brinton -- Normative and rational explanations of a classic case / by Debra Friedman -- A French political regionalism, 1849-1978 / by William Brustein -- Karl Polanyi's social theory / by Michael Hechter -- A theory of institutional change and the economic history of the Western world / by Douglass C. North -- The predatory theory of rule / by Margaret Levi -- Why workers strike / by Debra Friedman

This review is part of Global Perspectives Review Symposium on Democracy.

The Irish famine of the mid nineteenth century and the Ukrainian famine of the twentieth century have been the subject of large and quite contentious literatures. Whereas many popular explanations of the Irish famine attribute it to the English government's infatuation with laissez-faire economic doctrines, by contrast the Ukrainian famine has often been ascribed to Stalin's resentment of Ukraine's resistance to the Soviet revolution. This essay suggests that despite their many differences, during these years both Ireland and Ukraine can be considered to have been internal colonies of their respective empires. The key implication of this conception is that these appalling famines arose from a common underlying cause: namely, the inferior political status of these regions relative to that of the core regions of these states. One of the defining characteristics of internal colonies is that they often suffer from alien rule. Alien rulers are typically indifferent to the welfare of the residents of the culturally distinctive regions within their borders. Due to this indifference, both the British and Soviet central rulers cast a blind eye to the fate of the Irish and Ukrainian peasants.

It is commonplace to explain nationalist movements by adverting to the demand for national self-determination. Indeed, nationalism is frequently defined in precisely these terms. Discontent with alien rule—the obverse of national self-determination—is often assumed to be pervasive, if not universal, thus accounting for the absence of an international market in governance services. There is no shortage of explanations of the antipathy to alien rule and a great deal of corroborative evidence. Many believe that people seem to prefer to be badly ruled by their own kind than better ruled by aliens. Yet if this is true, then identity trumps competence in the assessment of rule, implying that we are all liable to suffer from suboptimal governance. In contrast, this article argues that the evidence for the pervasiveness of antipathy to alien rule is overdrawn. To that end, it distinguishes between two different types of alien rule, elected and imposed; provides a brief portrait of each; and suggests that when aliens are confronted with incentives to rule fairly and efficiently, they can gain legitimacy even when they have been imposed. This conclusion has implications for the prospects of an international market in governance services.