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Abstract
The article argues that a central part of moral integrity under the condition of moral enlightenment consists in virtues concerning thinking and discussing about moral problems.

Abstract
Beckermann states correctly that one wing of the Vienna Circle advocated a program of rationality including theoretical as well as practical questions. However, contrary to Beckermann, it can be pointed out that there is no consistent relationship between the theoretical and practical parts of this program. These inconsistencies could be eliminated if one takes the historical background from which Logical Empiricism originated into consideration.

Die Systemtheorie Luhmanns unterscheidet sich vom "klassischen amerikanischen Funktionalismus" durch eine theoretische "Radikalisierung" und eine methodische Umorientierung von "kausalwissenschaftlichen Funktionalismus" zum "Äquivalenzfunktionalismus". Ihre wesentliche Aussagen korrespondieren den Grundproblemen des Spätkapitalismus, den Problemen der "strukturellen Stabilisierung" und der Legitimationsbeschaffung. In dieser Hinsicht ist Luhmanns Theorie "administrative Hilfswissenschaft". Analog zum "konservativen Institutionalismus" Gehlens, für den Institutionen einen "Eigenwert" besitzen, kann Luhmanns Theorie als "technokratischer Institutionalismus" bezeichnet werden, in dem "heteronome Instanzen" (Systeme, Institutionen) für die Individuen die Aufgabe der Komplexitätsreduktion übernehmen. Die Suche nach auf "zu lösende Systemprobleme" bezogenen funktionalen Äquivalenten begründet "im Ansatz eine Sozialtechnologie" oder "Soziokybernetik". Gegenaufklärerisch ist, wie die Habermas-Luhmann-Debatte ("zweite Phase des Positivismusstreits") zeigt, nicht jede Systemtheorie schlechthin, wohl aber Luhmanns Variante, die "Theorie universaler Verwaltung". (WZ)

Main description: Moral kann nur dort einigermaßen verläßlich wirken, wo ihr entweder direkte oder gleichgerichtete Interessen beispringen oder aber keine derartigen Interessen signifikant berührt werden. Das gilt jedenfalls im moralischen Alltag des moralischen Normalbürgers. In diesem Buch werden die verschiedenen Facetten der Anwendung eines Rationalwahlansatzes (rational choice) auf moralische und moralrelevante Phänomene demonstriert. Das Programm eines Rationalwahlansatzes wurde in den letzten Jahrzehnten vornehmlich von den Ökonomen vorangetrieben. Vertreter anderer Disziplinen reagierten auf den "ökonomischen Imperialismus" überwiegend mit vorurteilsbeladener Ablehnung. Im Gegensatz dazu diskutieren im vorliegenden Buch wohlinformierte Sympathisanten des Rationalwahlansatzes das Verhältnis von Moral und Interesse und zeigen dabei dessen Grenzen und Leistungsfähigkeit auf. Aus dem Inhalt: Rainer Hegselmann: Was könnte dazu motivieren, moralisch zu sein? Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Moralität und Klugheit Bernd Lahno: Über den quasi-naturrechtlichen Charakter der Pflicht, Versprechen zu halten Michael Baurmann: Universalisierung und Partikularisierung der Moral - Ein individualistisches Erklärungsmodell Bruno S. Frey: Moral und ökonomische Anreize: Der Verdrängungseffekt Reinhard Zint:l Moral in Organisationen - wieviel und welche Unternehmenskultur verträgt eine freiheitliche Ordnung? Hartmut Kliemt: Interessenbasierte Moralbegründung in Ethik und Ökonomik Viktor Vanberg: Moral und Interesse, Ethik und Ökonomik Rudolf Schüßler: Hobbes und der Egoismus

Abstract
In this paper we compare two micro foundations for modelling human behaviour and decision making. We focus on perfect strategic rationality on the one hand and a simple reinforcement mechanism on the other hand. Iterated prisoner's dilemmas serve as the play ground for the comparison. The main lesson of our analysis is that in the space of all possible 2 × 2 PDs different micro foundations do matter. This suggests that researchers can not safely rely on the assumption that implementing simple models of decision making will yield the same results that may be obtained when more sophisticated decision rules are built into the agents.

In this book experts from quite different fields present simulations of social phenomena: economists, sociologists, political scientists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, organisational scientists, decision scientists, geographers, computer scientists, AI and AL scientists, mathematicians and statisticians. They simulate markets, organisations, economic dynamics, coalition formation, the emergence of cooperation and exchange, bargaining, decision making, learning, and adaptation. The history, problems, and perspectives of simulating social phenomena are explicitly discussed

Abstract
Do individuals accept a moral point of view - if they are completely oriented towards their natural preferences and interests? The present article outlines the context of discussion concerning this question within moral philosophy and the social science. In addition it suggests a game-theoretical model with the help of which the question can be answered positively.

Model building in the social sciences can increasingly rely on well elaborated formal theories. At the same time inexpensive large computational capacities are now available. Both make computer-based model building and simulation possible in social science, whose central aim is in particular an understanding of social dynamics. Such social dynamics refer to public opinion formation, partner choice, strategy decisions in social dilemma situations and much more. In the context of such modelling approaches, novel problems in philosophy of science arise which must be analysed - the main aim of this book. Interest in social simulation has recently been growing rapidly world- wide, mainly as a result of the increasing availability of powerful personal computers. The field has also been greatly influenced by developments in cellular automata theory (from mathematics) and in distributed artificial intelligence which provided tools readily applicable to social simulation. This book presents a number of modelling and simulation approaches and their relations to problems in philosophy of science. It addresses sociologists and other social scientists interested in formal modelling, mathematical sociology, and computer simulation as well as computer scientists interested in social science applications, and philosophers of social science

SUMMARYA pandemic is not only a biological event and a public health disaster, but it also generates impacts that are worth understanding from economic, societal, historical, and cultural perspectives. In this contribution, we argue that as the disease spreads, we are able to harness a valuable key resource: people who have immunity to coronavirus. This vital resource must be effectivelyemployed, it must becertified, it must besearchedfor, it must befound, and it may even beactively produced. We discuss why this needs to be done and how this can be achieved. Our arguments not only apply to the current pandemic but also to any future rapidly spreading, infectious disease epidemics. In addition, we argue for high awareness of a major secondary, nonbiological crisis arising from the side effects of societal and economic pandemic reactions to actual or imagined health risks. There is a risk that the impacts of the secondary crisis could outweigh that of the biological event.