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This article deals with the interesting three-way relationship between Israel, France, and the former French colonies in Africa located south of the Sahara during the years 1958–62. The main argument of the paper is that in French Africa Israel and France maintained a sort of symbiosis: by seeking its own self-interest, each side fulfilled a vital function for the other. France showed great patience with Israel's attempts to penetrate its former colonies, more so than vis-a-vis any other countries. From Israel's standpoint this was a great opportunity, since it granted Israel a kind of exclusivity over supplementing French aid in its former colonies: France removed possible competition and made the assistance that Israel could offer even more attractive to the Africans. For its part, Israel saw itself as being required, almost without exception, to obtain France's consent of undertakings that it initiated in the African states. Therefore, if it was decreed that the new states in Africa were to receive assistance from other countries, then Israel was a convenient default, since it, more than any other country, showed sensitivity to the French interests there.

The article illuminates the International Relations (IR) enigma of how states with relative low power succeed in gaining privileges reserved for great powers. Many IR studies on status stress the importance of social recognition as a precondition for enjoying the status of a great power. However, very few focus on the factors that affect such recognition. This article tries to fill this gap by looking at systemic wars. Systemic wars are special circumstances wherein a new world order is built and privileges are redistributed among states. In these situations, states may use their symbolic, moral, and circumstantial assets to grant themselves a paramount role in the new order. A state's previous status as a great power, its contribution to victory in a war, and the utilitarian considerations of other countries are all assets that help it to win the privileges reserved for great powers - and that in the long run could gain it recognition as a great power, despite its lack of the requisite capabilities. By using this conceptual framework in the case of France during and after the Second World War, this article tries to explain how a relatively weak power can gain a leading role in a postwar order. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe article illuminates the International Relations (IR) enigma of how states with relative low power succeed in gaining privileges reserved for great powers. Many IR studies on status stress the importance of social recognition as a precondition for enjoying the status of a great power. However, very few focus on the factors that affect such recognition. This article tries to fill this gap by looking at systemic wars. Systemic wars are special circumstances wherein a new world order is built and privileges are redistributed among states. In these situations, states may use their symbolic, moral, and circumstantial assets to grant themselves a paramount role in the new order. A state's previous status as a great power, its contribution to victory in a war, and the utilitarian considerations of other countries are all assets that help it to win the privileges reserved for great powers – and that in the long run could gain it recognition as a great power, despite its lack of the requisite capabilities. By using this conceptual framework in the case of France during and after the Second World War, this article tries to explain how a relatively weak power can gain a leading role in a postwar order.

This article reviews the changes that took place in de Gaulle's perception of Israel. It illustrates that the traditional interpretations in the literature are not precise. It identifies three distinct phases: A. Until the mid-1960s, de Gaulle valued the Jewish state and regarded it as balanced and moderate. B. Between 1963 and 1967, de Gaulle started to think of Israel as acting irresponsibly and contributing to the instability in the Middle East as a result of Israel's retaliation policy. C. After the Six Day War, an additional shift occurred in the way de Gaulle saw Israel. He began to regard the country as imperialistic and amoral. He implied on more than one occasion that he attributed this to the 'Jewish' qualities of the Israeli nation.

Abstract
This article argues that interpersonal commitment is statespersons' most highly coveted aim, the greatest benefit that interpersonal relations can yield in diplomacy. Accordingly, statespersons employ a range of relational practices in encounters with counterparts, seeking to create and harness commitment that will advance professional aims. We argue that statespersons can follow one of two paths to generate commitment: (1) creating feelings of gratitude and providing help that makes a counterpart feel indebted; or (2) cultivating friendly relations. Both demand the successful implementation of relational practices. On the basis of thirty semistructured interviews with past and present senior Israeli statespersons and an analysis of fifteen autobiographies written by senior Israeli diplomats and political figures, we demonstrate to what extent statespersons acknowledge the importance of interpersonal commitment and its ramifications; identify the relational practices that statespersons employ to elicit commitment from a counterpart; and discuss the conditions that facilitate the emergence of such a commitment. We conclude by discussing the differences between thin and thick interpersonal commitments and underlining the importance of interpersonal relations in diplomacy.