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Frontmatter -- PREFACE -- CONTENTS -- LIST OF CHARTS -- LIST OF TABLES -- CHAPTER I. EARLY PRICE MEASURES -- CHAPTER II. CENTRAL CONTROL BEGINS -- CHAPTER III. THE EFFECT OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE LIRA -- CHAPTER IV. THE CORPORATIVE CONTROL OF PRICES -- CHAPTER V. THE AIMS AND THEORY OF PRICE CONTROL -- CHAPTER VI. THE METHODS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL CONTROL -- CHAPTER VII. THE STATISTICS OF ITALIAN PRICES -- CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSIONS -- BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

In her 2006 book, The Bourgeois Virtues, economist and philosopher Deirdre McCloskey argued that what fundamentally drives economic development and growth is not so much government intervention or unrestricted libertinism but a set of "bourgeois virtues" that celebrates classical liberalism while powering the innovation that gave rise to modern economies. Drawing on the seven virtues proposed by St. Thomas Aquinas, McCloskey discusses the ways in which each virtue interfaced with the other six and their critical roles in the history of economic development. This article builds on her insights by making two moves. McCloskey, a skeptic of neo-institutional philosophies, does not consider significantly virtue's application to commercial organizations. I argue, however, that these ideas do matter to the organization and operation of businesses and similar institutions. In fact, I suggest that the ideology and ethics of institutions function as part of a dialectical conversation between the institutional "ontology" that forms the moral character of its members and those members, who, in turn, (re)form the institution's ethics. Second, if institutions can embody virtues, how the cardinal virtues—prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, and iustitia—figure institutionally is not difficult. More challenging is how the theological virtues—love, faith, and hope—which seem to apply to individuals, can apply. Thus, this article argues for how these virtues can be embodied in business organizations, concluding that such a framework allows for a "trinitarian" understanding of the economy as a perichoretic dynamic between the consumer, business organizations, and political/legal structures. In doing so, it criticizes and provides a way out of prevailing political dynamics that often pit individual freedom against institutions.

ABSTRACTDiscussion of medical researcher teams' ancillary‐care obligations has long been dominated by partial‐entrustment theory, developed in 2004 by the author of this article, in collaboration with Leah Belsky. Critics of the limited scope of the special ancillary‐care obligations defended by that theory, however, argue that a better theory would take fuller account of the relationship that develops between individual research participants and members of the research team. Nate W. Olson and Thaddeus Metz have each put forward well worked‐out versions of such a relationship‐based account of ancillary‐care obligations. This article critically evaluates these accounts, concluding that while each of them is vulnerable to various criticisms, each also crucially facilitates understanding of this relationship: Olson brings out well how research participants can find that role not just beneficial but also deeply meaningful, and Metz, drawing on African ethical traditions, emphasizes that when things go well, participants are involved as partners in the research effort. Yet the article closes by arguing that the partial‐entrustment theory, surprisingly, can take on board each of these lessons. As so enhanced, it may actually be the best available relationship‐based theory of this subject.