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At the request of the LIBE committee, this study provides a comparativeanalysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use ofintelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France,Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notablyhow national security can be invoked to determine the classification ofinformation and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings andwhether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of lawcompliant.The study finds that, in the majority of Member States underinvestigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectivelyadjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in'national security' cases. The research also illustrates that the very term'national security' is nebulously defined across the Member Statesanalysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and "inaccordance with the law" standards and a clear risk that the executiveand secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that nationaland transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation needto be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountabilityand be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

At the request of the LIBE committee, this study provides a comparativeanalysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use ofintelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France,Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notablyhow national security can be invoked to determine the classification ofinformation and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings andwhether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of lawcompliant.The study finds that, in the majority of Member States underinvestigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectivelyadjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in'national security' cases. The research also illustrates that the very term'national security' is nebulously defined across the Member Statesanalysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and "inaccordance with the law" standards and a clear risk that the executiveand secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that nationaland transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation needto be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountabilityand be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillanceprogrammes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillancepractices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France,Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillancepractices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligencegathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillanceprogrammes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between dataprotection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collectivefreedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member statesselected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scaleinterception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels anddiscrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. Thestudy argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside therealm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i)an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law frameworkwhere fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute keystandards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as awhole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potentialspillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study thenpresents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillanceprogrammes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillancepractices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France,Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillancepractices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligencegathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillanceprogrammes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between dataprotection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collectivefreedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member statesselected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scaleinterception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels anddiscrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. Thestudy argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside therealm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i)an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law frameworkwhere fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute keystandards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as awhole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potentialspillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study thenpresents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament.