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Abstract

Background
There is an increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during mass gatherings and a risk of asymptomatic infection. We aimed to estimate the use of masks during Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests and whether these protests increased the risk of COVID-19. Two reviewers screened 496 protest images for mask use, with high inter-rater reliability. Protest intensity, use of tear gas, government control measures, and testing rates were estimated in 12 cities. A correlation analysis was conducted to assess the potential effect of mask use and other measures, adjusting for testing rates, on COVID-19 epidemiology 4 weeks (two incubation periods) post-protests. Mask use ranged from 69 to 96% across protests. There was no increase in the incidence of COVID-19 post-protest in 11 cities. After adjusting for testing rates, only Miami, which involved use of tear gas and had high protest intensity, showed a clear increase in COVID-19 after one incubation period post-protest. No significant correlation was found between incidence and protest factors. Our study showed that protests in most cities studied did not increase COVID-19 incidence in 2020, and a high level of mask use was seen. The absence of an epidemic surge within two incubation periods of a protest is indicative that the protests did not have a major influence on epidemic activity, except in Miami. With the globally circulating highly transmissible Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants, layered interventions such as mandated mask use, physical distancing, testing, and vaccination should be applied for mass gatherings in the future.

There is an increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission during mass gatherings and a risk of asymptomatic infection. We aimed to estimate the use of masks during Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests and whether these protests increased the risk of COVID-19. Two reviewers screened 496 protest images for mask use, with high inter-rater reliability. Protest intensity, use of tear gas, government control measures, and testing rates were estimated in 12 cities. A correlation analysis was conducted to assess the potential effect of mask use and other measures, adjusting for testing rates, on COVID-19 epidemiology 4 weeks (two incubation periods) post-protests. Mask use ranged from 69 to 96% across protests. There was no increase in the incidence of COVID-19 post-protest in 11 cities. After adjusting for testing rates, only Miami, which involved use of tear gas and had high protest intensity, showed a clear increase in COVID-19 after one incubation period post-protest. No significant correlation was found between incidence and protest factors. Our study showed that protests in most cities studied did not increase COVID-19 incidence in 2020, and a high level of mask use was seen. The absence of an epidemic surge within two incubation periods of a protest is indicative that the protests did not have a major influence on epidemic activity, except in Miami. With the globally circulating highly transmissible Alpha, Delta, and Omicron variants, layered interventions such as mandated mask use, physical distancing, testing, and vaccination should be applied for mass gatherings in the future. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s40615-022-01308-4.

Infectious disease dynamic modeling can support outbreak emergency responses. We conducted a workshop to canvas the needs of stakeholders in Australia for practical, real-time modeling tools for infectious disease emergencies. The workshop was attended by 29 participants who represented government, defense, general practice, and academia stakeholders. We found that modeling is underused in Australia and its potential is poorly understood by practitioners involved in epidemic responses. The development of better modeling tools is desired. Ideal modeling tools for operational use would be easy to use, clearly indicate underlying parameterization and assumptions, and assist with policy and decision making.

Smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980, with known seed stock retained in two high security Biosafety Level 4 laboratories in the United States and Russia. Experts agree the likelihood of theft from these laboratories is low, and that synthetic creation of smallpox is a theoretical possibility. Until 2017 it was believed that synthetic smallpox was technically too complex a task to be a serious threat. However, in 2017, Canadian scientists synthesised a closely related orthopoxvirus, horsepox, using mail order DNA and $100,000. Simultaneously, terrorist groups have declared intent to conduct biological attacks. In this context an exercise was held on August 16th 2018, with international and cross-sectoral stakeholders to review preparedness for a bioterrorism attack in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. The exercise was conducted by The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Centre for Research Excellence, Integrated Systems for Epidemic Response, with contextual input from the Ministry of Health and Medical Services Fiji. The scenario involved a deliberate release in Fiji, followed by a larger release in a more populous Asian country. Mathematical modelling was used to underpin epidemic projections under different conditions. The exercise alternated between clinical, public health, emergency and societal responses, with participants making real-time decisions on cross-sectoral response across the region and the world. Key weak points which are influential in determining the final size and impact of the epidemic were identified (based on mathematical modelling of transmission in Fiji and globally). We identified potential gaps in preparedness for smallpox and factors which influence the severity of a smallpox epidemic. This included identifying which determinants of epidemic size are potentially within our control, and which are not. Influential factors within our control include: preventing an attack through intelligence, law enforcement and legislation; speed of diagnosis; speed and completeness of case finding and case isolation; speed and security of vaccination response, including stockpiling; speed and completeness of contact tracing; protecting critical infrastructure and business continuity; non-pharmaceutical interventions (social distancing, PPE, border control); protecting first responders; operational support and logistics; social mobilisation and risk communication. Based on discussion at the workshop between diverse stakeholders, recommendations were made to guide improved prevention, mitigation and rapid response, thus providing a holistic, cross-sectoral framework for prevention of a worst-case scenario smallpox pandemic.