Search results

"Relations between the new state of Israel and the European Union in the first twenty years of the Community's existence were a major policy issue given the background of the Holocaust and the way the new nation was established. This book focuses on Israel-European Community relations from 1957 to 1975 - from the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), which officially established the Common Market, to the conclusion of Israel's Free Trade Agreement with the Community. It reveals a new and key facet of Israeli diplomacy during the country's infancy, joining the many studies concerning Israel's relations with the United States, France, Germany and Britain"--

While most international relations (IR) scholars tend to minimize the effect of relations between statespersons on foreign policy, this article argues that interpersonal relationships have more weight than the literature suggests. On the basis of twenty-one interviews conducted with senior Israeli statespersons, we propose a two-level model-linking positive interaction between statespersons and actual consequences at the state level. At the personal level, positive interactions can create receptiveness, build trust, facilitate accessibility and availability, and advance personal commitment. Translating these outcomes into consequences at the state level is mediated either by persuasion or by commitment. If persuasion is effective or there exists a high level of personal commitment, statespersons are more likely to succeed in mobilizing international support, removing obstacles to agreements, gathering sensitive information, and diffusing interstate tension. We conclude by discussing the limitations and advantages of good personal relations between statespersons and their implications for IR practice and theory.

This article claims that normative arguments play a greater role in negotiations than existing scholarship implies. While the approaches of communicative and rhetorical action limit the use of arguments to environments that meet certain conditions, in fact normative arguments are widely used and can be found in almost every example of negotiations. This article seeks to explain this phenomenon. Negotiating parties that feel obligated to tackle normative arguments raised by the opposing side – either because of the presence of an audience or to maintain its reputation – have a number of tools at their disposal. Negotiators who are unsuccessful in tackling these arguments will tend to offer a proposal that is more attractive to the other side. Although normative arguments do not generally have a sweeping influence on the outcome of negotiations, they are still likely to play a significant role. The article applies this theoretical framework to the case of the lengthy negotiations between the EEC and Israel, in which the former had no material motivation and desire to cede to Israel's demands and nevertheless did so.

International Relations scholars and practitioners commonly agree that relationships in world politics are managed impersonally. Personal connections between agents of states are perceived as having only little impact on foreign policy of states. The current article challenges this impersonal ethos, suggesting that personal relationships play an important role in conducting, and thus understanding, interstate relations. Interviews conducted with 21 senior Israeli officials concerning mundane professional practices reveal three elements that are essential for successful statecraft: acknowledging the power of interpersonal relations; substantive knowledge of counterparts; and the excellent communicative competencies needed to realize the potential of personal connections. We argue that statespersons' behavior can be located on an impersonal-interpersonal continuum. Furthermore, we suggest explanations for deviations from the impersonal ethos and discuss the role of interpersonal practices in managing interstate relations. At the very least, the personal aspect should be taken into consideration when examining foreign policy. However, personal relations may have a highly significant impact on interstate interactions, thus requiring a revision of the current paradigm in IR, which marginalizes the personal aspect.

State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilize political change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming' are often ineffective, suggesting that policy makers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violating norms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allow them to pursue policies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomena that provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion, while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theory by examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel's political agenda during the first decade of its existence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparation agreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political forums.

Reminiscing during foreign state visits serves as a discursive means for building interstate relationships. When political leaders strategically narrate their states' historical legacies, they construct a collective memory that serves as a resource for creating and sustaining amicable relations between states. Studying evocations of past events in 455 speeches delivered during foreign state visits between 2010 and 2020, we demonstrate the prevalence and significance of the practice of reminiscing in interstate politics. We suggest bonding narratives as a device through which a connection is generated between two collectives to create and sustain positive relations. Despite the unique nature of bonding narratives, the constructed collective memory mostly relies on shared memories of wars, once again underlining the link between nations and violence.

Personal commitments are a ubiquitous but undertheorized phenomenon in the everyday wheels of world politics. While resonating with multiple threads in international relations theory, the role of individuals' commitments in statecraft, diplomacy, and foreign policy has hardly been addressed in and of itself. Drawing on insights from symbolic interactionism and organizational psychology, this article conceptualizes the notion of commitment highlighting its omnipresence in foreign policy and diplomatic practice. Specifically, the article demonstrates the analytical cache of the notion of commitment by focusing on moments when state-agents deviated from their commitment to the national interest, acting on behalf of other foci of commitment. Relying on Israeli, French, and EU diplomatic archives, we examine three illustrative case studies that show how and why state-agents dedicate time, energy, and resources to advance interests other than those of the state.

This paper suggests a framework for studying how remedial actions are deployed following diplomatic crisis. On the basis of thirty-four case studies and twenty-one interviews with senior statespersons, we offer a novel typology of remedial strategies employed for diffusing interstate tension and pinpoint the various calculations taken by decision-makers in performing them. The analysis reveals three primary strategies for restoring diplomatic relations, the last of which was neglected thus far in the literature: reframing, wherein state actors negotiate the definition of transgressions and their responsibility for its occurrence; remorse, wherein the accused actors acknowledge ranging degrees of responsibility for committing wrongdoing; and finally, reassurance, wherein actors channel the remedial focus to the future relationship between the involved parties. Moreover, statespersons articulated several considerations taken into account when selecting a specific remedial strategy: the perceived value of the offended party, domestic political criticism, levels of publicity, adjusting a specific remedy to the target audience, and self-image. We conclude by discussing the value of remedial work for the study of diplomatic crises.