Search results

Multiple criticisms of John Maynard Keynes' macroeconomic theories appeared between the mid-1960s, when dissident schools of economic theory & research consolidated their prominence at the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago & other institutional sites of economic research & writing (Delazay & Garth, 2002), & the early 1980s, when these views & theories became internalized in governmental & non-profit institutions & dominated journalistic writing & public opinion at large (Lind, 1996). The Keynesian economic model was criticized on a number of points: for stressing the demand side of the economy, for being too short term in its perspective, for disregarding agents' rational expectations. It was criticized for being a 'closed-system' & for depending too much on fixed exchange rates & on stable global costs such as oil prices. In terms of policy, it was suspected that Keynesian economic theory was subject to or even inclined towards irresponsible misuse-e.g. the ill-timed & excessively stimulative use of specific economic policy instruments within a 'political business cycle'-& it was criticized for being too dependent on monetary preconditions. In response to these criticisms, I will simply call attention to two aspects of Keynesian economics that would support contemporary or prospective economic & financial policies in a Keynesian perspective. Adapted from the source document.

Examines US wealth, income concentration/distribution, economic oligarchy, & conservative politics in the 20th century, considering the implications for democracy. If the middle of the century was marked by the liberalism & egalitarian thrust of the New Deal, recent decades have been characterized by the conservative Republican ascendancy & with it, greater party polarization & income inequality. Directions for further research & scholarship are proposed. 1 Table, 5 Figures, 20 References. K. Coddon

This article bridges two research traditions, analytical induction (AI) and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in the context of a study of early welfare state formation. First, the article differentiates classical AI from neoanalytical induction (NAI), tracing the latter to the former and identifying some problems with NAI. Next, it outlines QCA and identifies some problems with it. Third, it sketches two bridges, along with solutions that they offer for some limitations of NAI and QCA. One bridge links NAI's method, in essence a logical implementation of the idea of the working hypothesis, to QCA's powerful Boolean technology. The second bridge joins AI's stress on the reformulation of hypotheses in the face of negative evidence to QCA's capacities for complex inductive and logical specifications of the relations of explanatory to dependent variables. Following that, the article summarizes portions of a study of early 20th-century welfare state formation and uses them to illustrate the bridges. It concludes with a discussion of the analytical promise of a variant of QCA that stresses theory building in the AI tradition.