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The debate about the democratic deficit of the European Union has preoccupied scholars for decades. This article examines democracy in the Union from the perspective of citizens by asking what determines satisfaction with EU democracy? Two key models of regime support are applied to the European Union: the output-oriented performance model and the input-oriented procedural model. Contrary to previous work, it is argued here that there is a positive spillover effect from confidence in national institutions to the European level. These propositions are tested using survey data from 27 EU Member States. Using multi-level modelling, it is found that both performance and procedural factors matter, and that confidence in EU institutions matters more to citizens who are knowledgeable about the EU. Adapted from the source document.

The debate about the democratic deficit of the European Union has preoccupied scholars for decades. This article examines democracy in the Union from the perspective of citizens by asking what determines satisfaction with EU democracy? Two key models of regime support are applied to the European Union: the output-oriented performance model and the input-oriented procedural model. Contrary to previous work, it is argued here that there is a positive spillover effect from confidence in national institutions to the European level. These propositions are tested using survey data from 27 EU Member States. Using multi-level modelling, it is found that both performance and procedural factors matter, and that confidence in EU institutions matters more to citizens who are knowledgeable about the EU. Adapted from the source document.

This book offers the first comprehensive political analysis of the Euro crisis and its impact on democratic politics in the EU. Leading scholars provide political, economic, legal, and sociological perspectives on the main issues at stake and evaluate the prospects of a more legitimate and democratic Europe.

AbstractDemocratic stability hinges on voters' commitment to democratic norms, yet there are many examples of voters' willingness to tolerate politicians who violate such principles. This article examines whether critical responses by other politicians can effectively counter the appeal of political candidates who have engaged in authoritarian behavior. We argue that costly action by fellow partisan politicians can reduce the electoral popularity of authoritarian politicians. We test this in a preregistered conjoint experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in the United Kingdom. The results show that voters are less likely to choose politicians displaying authoritarian behavior, when they are criticized by other legislators, and that such counteractions are particularly effective when they are costly. These findings have important implications, as they show that politicians, especially co-partisans, can play an important role in reducing the appeal of authoritarian politicians.