Search results

"Examining how the press in Britain, Sweden and Finland responded to the Holocaust immediately after the Second World War, Holmila offers new insights into the challenge posed by the Holocaust for liberal democracies by looking at the reporting of the liberation of the camps, the Nuremberg trial and the Jewish immigration to Palestine."--

AbstractDuring the Second World War, not only the United States but also Great Britain played a leading role in planning and establishing the United Nations (UN) as a new international organisation to replace the League of Nations. While scholarship on post‐war planning is extensive, relatively little exists on how the planning process was discussed and depicted publicly in Britain. The purpose of this article is to fill such lacunae by examining the two most important domains for public discussion at the time, the press and parliament. It will argue, first, that the League of Nations' experience – its inability to use collective force and its optimistically democratic structure – overwhelmingly shaped public discourse in reference to the UN. By referring to the past, the press and politicians alike in Britain were content to relinquish interwar ideas such as equal rights and equal representation for all nations. Second, apart from the lessons of history, the less democratic structure of the new world organisation was justified from the perspective of great power politics. The desire to make the grand alliance between Britain, the United States of America, and the USSR functional despite all mutual suspicions, directed the view of the UN, and typically overrode all other concerns relating to post‐war planning. Finally, throughout the wartime planning of the UN, public opinion, in so far as press and parliament were concerned, held fast to the idea that the British empire was not to be touched by the UN. In public, the establishment of the UN was hardly considered as a starting point for decolonisation. Instead, the UN was designed to become the post‐war embodiment of the grand alliance, a vehicle through which the victory over the Axis powers would be managed at the global level: such management did not envision the need to let empire go. Viewed this way, it also becomes clear that nationalism and internationalism were not mutually exclusive or binary visions, but coexisted and shifted in importance throughout the period examined.

This article examines Nicholas J. Spykman's scholarship beyond geopolitics and International Relations (IR). Because his works have mainly been studied through these prisms, I argue that we have overlooked the most important underlying current of his work: historical sociology. As a result, the prevailing view of him is overtly narrow. When Spykman's scholarly output is examined from the 1920s to 1940s, an entirely different view of Spykman emerges. Essentially, his fundamental understanding of world affairs derived from the German sociologist Georg Simmel's theories. In the 1920s and 1930s, Spykman transmuted these underpinnings into IR that later in the 1940s guided his two major works: America's Strategy in World Politics and posthumously published The Geography of the Peace. Moreover, his magnum opus, America's Strategy, was not primarily about geopolitics but a forceful contribution to the American debate between isolationism and internationalism. His main goal was to make the Americans understand that geography with its links to economic and military matters made isolationism a futile approach to US national security. This article will contribute to a more multidisciplinary appreciation of his work highlighting his significance and impact by showing how his scholarship reached beyond geopolitics. ; peerReviewed

During the Second World War, not only the United States but also Great Britain played a leading role in planning and establishing the United Nations (UN) as a new international organisation to replace the League of Nations. While scholarship on post‐war planning is extensive, relatively little exists on how the planning process was discussed and depicted publicly in Britain. The purpose of this article is to fill such lacunae by examining the two most important domains for public discussion at the time, the press and parliament. It will argue, first, that the League of Nations' experience – its inability to use collective force and its optimistically democratic structure – overwhelmingly shaped public discourse in reference to the UN. By referring to the past, the press and politicians alike in Britain were content to relinquish interwar ideas such as equal rights and equal representation for all nations. Second, apart from the lessons of history, the less democratic structure of the new world organisation was justified from the perspective of great power politics. The desire to make the grand alliance between Britain, the United States of America, and the USSR functional despite all mutual suspicions, directed the view of the UN, and typically overrode all other concerns relating to post‐war planning. Finally, throughout the wartime planning of the UN, public opinion, in so far as press and parliament were concerned, held fast to the idea that the British empire was not to be touched by the UN. In public, the establishment of the UN was hardly considered as a starting point for decolonisation. Instead, the UN was designed to become the post‐war embodiment of the grand alliance, a vehicle through which the victory over the Axis powers would be managed at the global level: such management did not envision the need to let empire go. Viewed this way, it also becomes clear that nationalism and internationalism were not mutually exclusive or binary visions, but coexisted and shifted in importance throughout the ...

"It is commonplace that the modern world is more international than at any point in human history. Yet the sheer profusion of terms for describing political orders above the nation-state-including "international," "global," "transnational," and "cosmopolitan," among others-is but one indication of how conceptually complex this topic actually is. Taking a wide view of international projects in Europe since the eighteenth century, Nationalism and Internationalism Intertwined explores discourses and practices to challenge nation-centered histories and trace the entanglements that arise from international cooperation. In this volume, a multidisciplinary group of scholars in history, political science, philosophy, computer science, and other fields ask how internationalism and adjacent concepts have been experienced, understood, constructed, debated, and redefined across different European political cultures"--

How will Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine end? What kinds of political scenarios could stop the suffering and bring stability to the region? Of all the different future scenarios none is particularly encouraging. In particular, the prospect of a 'Finlandized' Ukraine has met with near universal rejection. Yet, ever since Russia's illegal annexation of the Crimea, 'Finlandization' of Ukraine has been discussed as a potential solution.

The carnage of World War I gave rise to liberal visions for a new world
order with democratized foreign policy and informed international public
opinion. Conservatives emphasized continuity in national sovereignty,
while socialists focused on the interests of the working class. While British
diplomacy in the construction of the League of Nations has been widely
discussed, we focus on contemporary uses of nationalism and internationalism
in parliamentary and press debates that are more ideological. We also
examine how failed internationalist visions influenced uses of these concepts
during World War II, supporting alternative organizational solutions,
caution with the rhetoric of democracy and public opinion, and ways to
reconcile national sovereignty with a new world organization. The United
Nations was to guarantee the interests of the leading powers (including the
United States), while associations with breakthroughs of democracy were
avoided. Nationalism (patriotism) and internationalism were reconciled
with less idealism and more pragmatism.

The carnage of World War I gave rise to liberal visions for a new world order with democratized foreign policy and informed international public opinion. Conservatives emphasized continuity in national sovereignty, while socialists focused on the interests of the working class. While British diplomacy in the construction of the League of Nations has been widely discussed, we focus on contemporary uses of nationalism and internationalism in parliamentary and press debates that are more ideological. We also examine how failed internationalist visions influenced uses of these concepts during World War II, supporting alternative organizational solutions, caution with the rhetoric of democracy and public opinion, and ways to reconcile national sovereignty with a new world organization. The United Nations was to guarantee the interests of the leading powers (including the United States), while associations with breakthroughs of democracy were avoided. Nationalism (patriotism) and internationalism were reconciled with less idealism and more pragmatism. ; peerReviewed