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Much of the violence carried out by rebels seeking secession or territorial autonomy occurs within the area under dispute. Still, territory-seeking rebels sometimes attack civilians in other parts of the country. By developing a diversionary theory of violence, this article helps explain why and when they do so. Rebels in territorial disputes aim to keep the government's forces out of their claimed homeland. Attacking civilians outside of the disputed area may help achieve this aim because it pushes the government to disperse its forces and commit resources to protection. Incentives for such diversionary violence are likely to prove particularly high during military offensives, when the government seeks to concentrate its forces in the contested area. I first assess the theory through a quantitative analysis of territorial conflicts worldwide between 1989 and 2015. Second, I conduct a case study of the Sri Lankan Eelam Wars, combining process-tracing and a quantitative test using new events data. I find that rebels do tend to escalate violence outside their claimed territory during government offensives and that diversion is an important causal mechanism.

Much of the violence carried out by rebels seeking secession or territorial autonomy occurs within the area under dispute. Still, territory-seeking rebels sometimes attack civilians in other parts of the country. By developing a diversionary theory of violence, this article helps explain why and when they do so. Rebels in territorial disputes aim to keep the government's forces out of their claimed homeland. Attacking civilians outside of the disputed area may help achieve this aim because it pushes the government to disperse its forces and commit resources to protection. Incentives for such diversionary violence are likely to prove particularly high during military offensives, when the government seeks to concentrate its forces in the contested area. I first assess the theory through a quantitative analysis of territorial conflicts worldwide between 1989 and 2015. Second, I conduct a case study of the Sri Lankan Eelam Wars, combining process-tracing and a quantitative test using new events data. I find that rebels do tend to escalate violence outside their claimed territory during government offensives and that diversion is an important causal mechanism.

This article explores how insurgencies emerge and spread within a country over time through an analysis of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It argues that important processes underpinning the spread of insurgency are likely to change with shifts in the relative military capacity of belligerents. Importantly, insurgents can to a greater extent spread the insurgency by using coercion, material incentives, and movement of forces when they are militarily strong than when they are weak. This in turn leads to changes in the local conditions favorable to insurgency. I hypothesize that inaccessible terrains, preexisting rebel networks, and proximity to insurgent areas are likely to be important determinants of local insurgency onset during rebel weakness, but should decline in importance as the rebels gain strength. I find support for these arguments in a mixed-methods analysis of Nepal's insurgency that combines a qualitative narrative and a quantitative event history analysis.

This article explores how insurgencies emerge and spread within a country over time through an analysis of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It argues that important processes underpinning the spread of insurgency are likely to change with shifts in the relative military capacity of belligerents. Importantly, insurgents can to a greater extent spread the insurgency by using coercion, material incentives, and movement of forces when they are militarily strong than when they are weak. This in turn leads to changes in the local conditions favorable to insurgency. I hypothesize that inaccessible terrains, preexisting rebel networks, and proximity to insurgent areas are likely to be important determinants of local insurgency onset during rebel weakness, but should decline in importance as the rebels gain strength. I find support for these arguments in a mixed-methods analysis of Nepal's insurgency that combines a qualitative narrative and a quantitative event history analysis.

This article explores how insurgencies emerge and spread within a country over time through an analysis of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. It argues that important processes underpinning the spread of insurgency are likely to change with shifts in the relative military capacity of belligerents. Importantly, insurgents can to a greater extent spread the insurgency by using coercion, material incentives, and movement of forces when they are militarily strong than when they are weak. This in turn leads to changes in the local conditions favorable to insurgency. I hypothesize that inaccessible terrains, preexisting rebel networks, and proximity to insurgent areas are likely to be important determinants of local insurgency onset during rebel weakness, but should decline in importance as the rebels gain strength. I find support for these arguments in a mixed-methods analysis of Nepal's insurgency that combines a qualitative narrative and a quantitative event history analysis.

The vast majority of civil wars occur in economically less developed countries, as measured by GDP per capita. Two suggested explanations for this are prominent: one emphasizing that poverty facilitates rebel recruitment due to lowered economic opportunity cost of rebelling, and the other highlighting that low state reach and capacity give political and military opportunity for organizing insurgency. I argue that the latter account is more powerful. Low state reach is vital not only to rebel survival; it also enables rebels to obtain control over remote settlements, which facilitates the effective use of persuasion, coercion, organization, and economic rewards for mobilizing recruits and other resources. Although low economic opportunity costs can ease recruitment, it may not be essential if such tools are available. The argument is supported by a quantitative analysis covering 133 countries from 1989 to 2006. Countries experiencing civil war were distinguished more by low state reach (measured by road density, telephone density, and % urban of the population) than by depth of poverty (measured by the mean income of the poorest decile). Moreover, the negative association between GDP per capita and civil war risk disappeared when controlling for state reach, but remained strong controlling for poverty.

The vast majority of civil wars occur in economically less developed countries, as measured by GDP per capita. This paper assesses two suggested explanations for this: one emphasizing that poverty facilitates rebel recruitment due to lowered economic opportunity cost of rebelling, and the other highlighting that low accessibility and state capacity give political and military opportunity for organizing insurgency. I argue that the latter account is more powerful. Low accessibility is vital not only to rebel survival; it also enables rebels to obtain control over remote settlements, which facilitates the effective use of persuasion, coercion, organization, and economic rewards for mobilizing recruits and other resources. Although low economic opportunity costs can ease recruitment, it may not be essential if such tools are available. The argument is supported by a quantitative analysis covering 133 countries from 1989-2006. Countries experiencing civil war were distinguished more by low accessibility (measured by road density, telephone density and % urban of the population) than by depth of poverty (measured by the mean income of the poorest decile). Moreover, the negative association between GDP per capita and civil war risk disappeared when controlling for accessibility, but remained strong controlling for poverty.