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The European debate on the challenges of globalisation often degenerates into a contest between a purportedly 'Anglo-American' model of liberalised markets lacking a social dimension, and an inflexible 'European Social Model' of generous welfare provision but slow growth and high unemployment. We argue in this article that this is a false choice. Data on the comparative performance of European states in implementing the 'Lisbon Agenda' show that countries which perform well in terms of economic efficiency and liberalisation also perform well socially. Although combining efficiency and equity may be easier for some political economies than for others, we question the notion that European states are irrevocably 'locked in' to particular welfare regime types, suggesting instead that they are generally 'hybrids', and that successful reforms may be achieved even in the most unlikely cases.

Studies the impact of various organizational models on party performance through a case study. The demise of the Union de Centro Democratico (UCD) was caused by the party's lack of institutionalization. One key component was the lack of commitment of the party's top-ranking leaders in Madrid, who interacted with the party in purely utilitarian terms to achieve election, but failed to tie values into the party institution or to develop loyalty toward the party. Lack of agreement was also evident regarding the model of the party, its electoral strategies, & its norms of internal governance. Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez wanted to develop a classic catch-all party with strong presidential leadership; while the party's 'barons' favored development along factional lines with collective decision-making processes. Different expectations led to infighting & defections by prominent leaders. The lack of commitment to the party at the abstract level, lack of behavioral norms, & intra-party decision-making processes destroyed the party & even threatened the survival of the new democratic regime. An electorate disillusioned with the UCD's destructive conflicts gave it the worst electoral defeat in West European history. 2 Tables, 1 Figure. L. A. Hoffman

Abstract. Discussion of new forms of party organisation have largely focused on the ways in which institutionalised parties have adapted to pressures towards 'catch–all' or 'electoral–professional' behaviour. This article examines the ways in which new parties respond to these pressures. A model of the 'party as business firm' is generated from rational choice assumptions and it is suggested that such a model can emerge when new party systems are created in advanced societies. Two cases of political parties which resemble the business firm model in important ways are analysed in order to gauge the consequences of this type of party organisation: UCD in Spain and Forza Italia in Italy. On the basis of this analysis it is argued that business firm parties are likely to be electorally unstable and politically incoherent, and also prone to serving particularistic interests.

Discussion of new forms of party organisation have largely focused on the ways in which institutionalised parties have adapted to pressures towards 'catch-all' or 'electoral-professional' behaviour. This article examines the ways in which new parties respond to these pressures. A model of the 'party as business firm' is generated from rational choice assumptions and it is suggested that such a model can emerge when new party systems are created in advanced societies. Two cases of political parties which resemble the business firm model in important ways are analysed in order to gauge the consequences of this type of party organisation: UCD in Spain and Forza Italia in Italy. On the basis of this analysis it is argued that business firm parties are likely to be electorally unstable and politically incoherent, and also prone to serving particularistic interests. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Since 1970 the United Kingdom, like the United States, has developed a "winner-take-all" political economy characterized by widening inequality and spectacular income growth at the top of the distribution. However, Britain's centralized executive branch and relatively insulated policymaking process are less amenable to the kind of "organized combat" that Hacker and Pierson describe for the United States. Britain's winner-take-all politics is better explained by the rise of political ideas favoring unfettered markets that, over time, produce a self-perpetuating structural advantage for the richest. That advantage is, in turn, justified and sustained by reference to the same ideas. Inequality growth in the United Kingdom has been primarily driven by the financialization of the economy that began under the Thatcher government and continued under New Labour. The survival of pro-finance policies through the financial crisis provides further evidence that lobbying by a weakened City of London was less decisive in shaping policy than the financial sector's continuing structural advantage and the tenacity of its supporting political consensus.

This article seeks to disentangle which features of government intervention are linked to corruption and which are not, by distinguishing between the government roles of regulator, entrepreneur, and consumer. It finds that the degree of regulation of private business activity is the strongest predictor of corruption, and that high levels of public spending are related to low levels of corruption. There is no evidence of direct government involvement in production having any bearing on corruption. It is concluded that advanced welfare capitalist systems, which leave business relatively free from interference while intervening strongly in the distribution of wealth and the provision of key services, combine the most "virtuous" features of "big" and "small" government. This suggests that anti‐corruption campaigners should be relaxed about state intervention in the economy in general, but should specifically target corruption‐inducing regulatory systems.