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Resisting the transnational -- Convergence with the transnational -- Engagement with the transnational -- Constitutional adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court : why engage the transnational? -- Engagement, U.S. interpretative theory, and our multifunctional constitutions -- Engaging the transnational : a contextual framework -- Engagement, equality, and older constitutions -- Constitutional particularities, federalism, and the transnational -- Constitutions as mediating institutions, transnational constitutional values and engagement in twenty-first century constitutional interpretation

The Supreme Court's revival of federalism as a limit on national power has roots, in part, in the court's mistrust of the national legislative process & its sense of institutional competition with Congress. To the extent that the Court is concerned about careless legislating, six rules of "care & craft" in drafting legislation are proposed for members of Congress to consider: develop a factual record, reflect the source of constitutional authority, tailor the statute to reach "national" & not "local" matters, consider the implications of decentralized enforcement for surviving constitutional challenges as well as for efficacy, consider whether state governments are treated comparably to the federal government, & be particularly cautious in efforts to overrule the effects of the Court's decisions. To the extent the Court is concerned with its own institutional prerogatives, however, or is committed to a categorical divide between areas constitutionally committed to the states & the federal government, care & craft alone will not be a solution. 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

DURING ITS 1988 TERM, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ADDRESSED TWO IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, WHICH GENERALLY PROTECTS STATES FROM BEING SUED IN FEDERAL COURTS. FIRST THE COURT HELD THAT THE CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ABROGATE STATES' IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. SECOND, THE COURT MADE CLEAR THAT ABORGATION WOULD BE FOUND ONLY WHERE THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE ITSELF CLEARLY AND SPECIFICALLY SO PROVIDED. THIS ARTICLE DESCRIBES THESE DECISIONS, AND ANALYZES SOME OF THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL FEDERALISM.

Nations around the world are facing various crises of ineffective government. Basic governmental functions-protecting rights, preventing violence, and promoting material well-being-are compromised, leading to declines in general welfare, in the enjoyment of rights, and even in democracy itself. This innovative collection, featuring analyses by leaders in the fields of constitutional law and politics, highlights the essential role of effective government in sustaining democratic constitutionalism. The book explores "effective government" as a right, principle, duty, and interest, situating questions of governance in debates about negative and positive constitutionalism. In addition to providing new conceptual approaches to the connections between rights and governance, the volume also provides novel insights into government institutions, including courts, legislatures, executives, and administrative bodies, as well as the media and political parties. This is an essential volume for anyone interested in constitutionalism, comparative law, governance, democracy, the rule of law, and rights.

With contributions from leading scholars in constitutional law, this volume examines how carefully designed and limited doctrines of proportionality can improve judicial decision-making, how it is applied in different jurisdictions, its role on constitutionalism outside the courts, and whether the principle of proportionality actually advances or detracts from democracy. Contributions from some of the seminal thinkers on the development of scholarship on proportionality (e.g. Alexy, Barak, and Beatty) extend their prior work and engage in an important dialogue on the topic. Some offer substantial critiques, others defend the doctrine and offer important clarifications and extensions of their prior work. Throughout, the authors engage not only with case law from around the world but also with existing scholarly treatments of the subject. Mathematical treatments are avoided, making the book accessible to readers from both 'soft' and hard' social science backgrounds.

With contributions from leading scholars in constitutional law, this volume examines how carefully designed and limited doctrines of proportionality can improve judicial decision-making, how it is applied in different jurisdictions, its role on constitutionalism outside the courts, and whether the principle of proportionality actually advances or detracts from democracy. Contributions from some of the seminal thinkers on the development of scholarship on proportionality (e.g. Alexy, Barak, and Beatty) extend their prior work and engage in an important dialogue on the topic. Some offer substantial critiques, others defend the doctrine and offer important clarifications and extensions of their prior work. Throughout, the authors engage not only with case law from around the world but also with existing scholarly treatments of the subject. Mathematical treatments are avoided, making the book accessible to readers from both 'soft' and hard' social science backgrounds