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AbstractParties usually argue in favour or against a government coalition based on party considerations in terms of projected policy implementation, power in office and vote maximization – that is, the 'policy, office, votes' triad. So far, however, it remains unclear which claims mainstream parties invoke to motivate their choice to rule or not rule with populist parties. Adopting the 'policy, voter, office' triad, this article examines mainstream parties' Twitter claims on ruling with populist parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (2006–2021, N = 1,919). Mainstream parties mainly reject ruling with (mostly radical right) populist parties. To justify unwillingness, policy-based motives referring to the populist parties' extremist nature trump motives on office-seeking and vote maximization. To justify willingness, predominantly office-seeking motivations are invoked. Party characteristics (ideology, incumbency status, size) and context, however, shape these claims. This study sheds light on mainstream parties' patterns of political communication on coalition formation with populist parties.

Abstract
Mass media have been accused of cultivating anti-immigrant sentiments in Western societies. Most studies on this topic, however, have not made a distinction between the types of television program (information vs. entertainment) or television station (public vs. commercial). Adopting a comparative approach, we use data from the six waves of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002–2012, n = 162,987) to assess the relationship between individual and aggregate level patterns of television consumption and anti-immigrant sentiments in European societies. Individual television viewing time is positively associated with anti-immigrant sentiments, while frequent exposure to news and information programs is associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments. At the aggregate level we observe a positive effect of the total viewing time in society on anti-immigrant sentiments. In the conclusion we offer some suggestions on how this effect could be explained.

AbstractTerror threat has been theorized to affect political attitudes. Most prior studies have focused exclusively on Islamist terror threat, while effects of right-wing extremist terrorism on voting behavior have been understudied. We argue that effects on the propensity to vote (PTV) for an anti-immigration party (AIP) depend on the type of threat and is moderated by right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP). Using a cross-country experiment in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (N = 1,187), we find that Islamist terror threat increases PTV for AIPs amongst voters high in RWA; similarly, right-wing extremist terror threat reduces PTV for AIPs amongst participants high in RWA. IMCP did not moderate the relationship between terror threat and PTV for an AIP.

AbstractSeveral anti-immigration politicians in Europe have been prosecuted for hate speech; some of these trials were highly mediatized. To what extent, and how, does hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians affect voting for their party? We address this question by an experiment (N = 372) using manipulated versions of a television news story about a politician of the Dutch Party Forum for Democracy (FvD). We go beyond prior studies by disentangling the mechanisms driving the electoral ramifications of hate speech prosecution, assessing the moderating role of multiculturalist attitudes separately and in combination with six mediators (anti-establishment attitudes, issue salience immigration, perceived party's effectiveness and legitimacy, support for free speech, and perceived party visibility). Among voters who are positive toward multiculturalism, exposure to a news story about prosecution boosts support for free speech and perceived visibility and support for the FvD. Both aspects are positively related to voting for FvD. This improves our understanding of the mechanisms of hate speech prosecution, informing public debates of how to react to controversial speech by politicians.

This study develops a model that contributes to our understanding of the complex relationship between economic motivations and anti-Muslim attitudes by analyzing the underexplored role of news consumption. Using a large-scale Dutch panel dataset ( n = 2694), we test a structural equation model theoretically grounded in group conflict theory, in which the relationship between news consumption and anti-Muslim attitudes is mediated by perceptions and emotions about the economy. Findings offer sound empirical support for the hypothesized model: news consumption increases pessimistic economic perceptions and negative emotions about the economy, which in turn strengthens anti-Muslim attitudes. The mechanism, however, largely depends on the type of news outlet and genre: watching television seems more decisive than reading newspapers; moreover, especially exposure to soft and popular news formats plays a dominant role.

Public and commercial news follow distinct logics. We evaluate this duality in television news coverage on immigration. First, by means of a large-scale content analysis of Flemish television news ( N = 1630), we investigate whether immigration coverage diverges between both broadcasters. Results show that, despite an overall negativity bias and relative homogeneity between the broadcasters, commercial news contains slightly more sensational and tabloid characteristics than public news. The latter promotes a more balanced view of immigration. These differences are stable over time. Second, using cross-sectional and panel data, we assess whether a preference for public versus commercial news is associated with an attitudinal gap in anti-immigrant attitudes. Findings demonstrate that individuals who prefer commercial news are more negative towards immigrants. We suggest that differences in news content may explain this attitudinal gap. In light of the debate around 'public value' offered by public service media across Europe, we tentatively conclude that public broadcasters have the potential to foster tolerance and provide balanced information by prioritizing a normative view over a market logic. The linkage between news coverage and the gap in attitudes between commercial and public news viewers warrants closer investigation in the future.

In Belgium, like in numerous other democracies, the representation of women in parliament has risen sharply in recent decades, partly because of gender quota legislation. This rapid evolution implies that traditional notions on the presence of gender bias in media reporting need to be re-assessed. Relying on data from more than six thousand full newscasts, we examine the allotted speaking time to members of parliament (MPs) from 2003 until 2011 in the two main television news broadcasts in the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. Multilevel regression analyses were conducted to determine which factors influence the probability and volume of television news coverage of MPs. The results indicate that—even controlling for alternative explanations—news media persist in a biased treatment of female MPs: Female MPs are significantly less likely to be allotted speaking time, and they receive less speaking time than their male colleagues. Moreover, results show that this gap in media coverage is present especially for elite and thus newsworthy positions. Apparently, gender bias in the media persists, even when the political system evolves rapidly toward equal representation.

This study examines the role of negative (anger, fear) and positive emotions in addition to political attitudes (political trust, populist attitudes, external political efficacy) as key determinants of voting behaviour. We rely on the RepResent voter survey conducted in 2019 in Belgium ( n = 3236) allowing us to assess the relationship between emotions, political attitudes, and the vote for radical right (VB, PP) and radical left parties (PTB-PVDA). Findings indicate that anger is significantly and positively related to voting for radical left and right parties, while controlling for key political attitudes and issue positions. Fear and positive emotions are not significantly more related to voting for radical parties than for other parties. The results suggest that anger should be more systematically integrated in electoral research. These findings call for further analysis on the causal mechanism linking emotions and voting behaviour, and the (in)direct effects of emotions on voting.

The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors—that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package—in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009–2020). Based on a content analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases ( N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases ( N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.