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This book moves away from the common belief that Japan's international relations are firmly the preserve of the national government in Japan's highly centralised political system. Examining examples of subnational governments (SNGs) across Japan the book uncovers a significant and generally unrecognised development in Japanese politics: SNGs are ever more dynamic international actors as national borders 'weaken' across the world. Exploring what Japanese SNGs do, where they do it, and why, the book considers the implications of these factors for Japan's international relations and domestic politics. By bringing to light the scope and consequences of the international actions of Japan's SNGs, this book provides a more accurate and nuanced understanding of the country's foreign policy, at a time when it is pursuing a broader and more active profile in international affairs.

After many decades of a relationship defined primarily by commercial ties, Japan and Australia now have a robust security and defence partnership. While making their bilateral relations more all-rounded in the Indo-Pacific era, they also aim to promote a regional order where the United States remains engaged and like-minded nations come together to manage the ever-volatile strategic environment in the wake of China's rise and US–China strategic rivalry. These tasks are not easy due to strategic complexities; how the two key Indo-Pacific nations respond to each other and to their partners in managing the China challenge while ensuring US commitment to the region will be of deep interest to policymakers and analysts alike.

India was initially a reluctant Quadrilateral (Quad) Security Dialogue partner. Today New Delhi is a willing partner and a strong supporter of the Quad. With continuing border tensions across the Himalayas and Beijing's growing assertiveness in India's neighbourhood, India has tied itself tightly to the United States and the Quad partner nations' strategies. While still pursuing strategic autonomy and engagement with Russia and dialogue with China, both of which oppose the Quad, India has embraced the Quad unhesitatingly and has now accepted Quad partners as like-minded nations.

The deadly conflict on the Ladakh border in June 2020 will force India to re-evaluate its approach to foreign policy. This dangerous turn, despite decades of mutual restraint, border talks, agreements and recent bonhomie between the Indian and Chinese leaders, has intensified the strategically tense environment of the Indo-Pacific region. China's assertiveness in the South China and East China seas and its technology and trade tensions with a number of neighbouring Asian and Western nations have already raised political temperatures in global politics. In that light, this article considers how the June 2020 border incident may influence India's strategic rethink, especially in relation to two key nations of the Indo-Pacific, Japan and Australia. The article suggests that forcing a re-evaluation of the strategic challenge posed by China, the June 2020 border confrontation has inspired a more realist edge to India's security thinking. India is continuing the strategic autonomy with a multi-alignment approach it has favoured, but with a keener sense of realpolitik it is pressing ahead to deepen its defence and strategic alignments with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific region. This means that India is not abandoning its relations with traditional partners such as Russia to instead pursue a more formal alliance with one or a group of other powers. Rather, India is further developing strategic partnerships with the United States and its allies, while continuing strong relations with Russia and other long-standing partners to 'balance' its national security position. This article identifies India's approach as 'hesitant realism', an explanatory term to explore India's moves to balance its external relations through growing ties with Japan and Australia—two US allies that are key Indo-Pacific nations.

China, Japan and India are overwhelming forces in world politics because of their large population, economic size and trade volume, strategic weight, potential for further technological advancement, economic growth, diplomatic heft and military power. Together they could be an unmatched global force, act as a catalyst to the much touted "Asian century" prospect and help redesign the existing international order to reflect power shift. Yet their relationship to each other is highly complex, and their world views on key issues and strategies of global interaction diverge significantly. Such an unhealthy politico-strategic landscape of the Asian continent is likely to continue. While these three recalibrate and redesign their relations to each other, other regional nations will need to carefully work around this tangled triangle.

This special issue presents analyses of the elections in India, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia, each written by a specialist with extensive experience of domestic politics and elections in their country of study. These articles offer detail and rich analysis of the elections in the five Indo- Pacific countries, all held in 2019. The analyses presented in this issue reveal some clear trends emerging from these elections. First, the ruling parties in each of these countries were returned to power or given endorsements, producing continuity in government. Second, in most cases the opposition forces seem frail and divided. Third, on the Asian political landscape, as in many other countries around the world, conservative nationalist and right-wing populist leaders dominate national politics.

Japan's upper house, the House of Councillors, is a less powerful body than the House of Representatives, the lower house of the national Diet. Yet, electoral results of the upper house can have a significant impact on the government of the day, both for legislative purposes and for judging the credibility of the ruling party and its leader. This article analyses the July 2019 election and its likely impact on the Abe administration, and implications for Japan's parliamentary democracy and party politics. The article argues that opposition forces are highly fragmented and weak, sustaining the LDP's dominance in Japanese politics. Such a political landscape is welcomed by the ruling party and its leader, but continuing to entrench the hold on national governance by one dominant party is unhealthy for Japanese democracy.

"Indo-Pacific" is a new term in the geopolitical lexicon and a response to rapidly evolving global power shifts that currently induce strategic realignments among major regional players. It is increasingly used by political leaders, policymakers, journalists and academic commentators and in government documents. While Indo-Pacific is used frequently today, each proponent of the term attaches varied emphases, guided by their own strategic prisms. The Indo-Pacific concept has yet to be institutionalised. Some offshoots, such as the rebirthed idea of a quadrilateral framework among the key proponents of a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and the proposal to jointly fund infrastructure projects in Asia, appear to be in direct competition with China's Belt and Road Initiative. How the Indo-Pacific concept would affect the regional power balance remains unclear. However, neither the concept nor the strategic thinking and actions it inspires will disappear anytime soon.

Domestic and international contests explain the transformation of Japan's foreign aid programme begun in the early 1950s. Through contests between domestic players, Japan has streamlined its aid processes by introducing institutional innovations, accommodating new actors in aid policy and delivery, and responding more sensitively to public opinion and independent advice. At the international level, contests have come from the Development Assistance Committee/Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the USA, and China. Through these contests, Japan has emerged as a more rounded aid donor. Its new aid model blends Western principles with concepts of 'self-help', favouring large infrastructure projects that serve both Japan's and recipient countries' interests. (Pac Rev/GIGA)