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AbstractIn a large sample of U.S. takeovers, we find that acquisitions of targets with greater financial independence are associated with higher takeover premiums and lower acquirer announcement returns. This empirical result is most consistent with targets' deriving bargaining power from their financial independence. Raising external funds is costly. Targets that do not depend on external funds do not need new external capital and have no reason to acquiesce potential takeover premium to acquirers that can provide capital. Therefore, more financially independent targets should be in stronger bargaining positions vis‐à‐vis potential acquirers, leading to the effect on takeover pricing that we observe.

We examine the impact of the Citizens United decision on firm value. While the value of U.S. firms do not respond significantly to the Citizens United decision on average, we find evidence that firms in industries subject to more extensive regulation react significantly and positively to the announcement. We also find evidence consistent with Justice John Paul Stevens' argument that the Court decision will affect state laws. Specifically, our results indicate that firms that are headquartered in states with more stringent limits on political spending by corporations respond positively to the announcement. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

We examine the impact of the Citizens United decision on firm value. While the value of U.S. firms do not respond significantly to the Citizens United decision on average, we find evidence that firms in industries subject to more extensive regulation react significantly and positively to the announcement. We also find evidence consistent with Justice John Paul Stevens' argument that the Court decision will affect state laws. Specifically, our results indicate that firms that are headquartered in states with more stringent limits on political spending by corporations respond positively to the announcement.