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In many cases assignment to a treatment may affect concomitant variables. I show how a concomitant variable can be used to corroborate evidence from an observational study. In the observational study two types of training programs are compared. One program is part of regular Swedish labor market training while the other program was run by Swedish industry during 1998-2000. A large and positive effect on employment is found from this latter program. In this program it was much easier to get employer contact than in the regular program. From a survey I have information about employer contacts in the two programs. I find the same positive effect on employment from employer contacts in either program and no effects from the new program when conditioning on employer contacts. I interpret this as a causal effect on employment from employer contacts. In addition, this effect is found to be more pronounced for individuals with a weak position in the labor market.

"This book presents research on a kind of water use conflicts that is becoming more and more common and important: How to best manage moving water in times of increasing demand for electricity as well as environmental services. How should decisions be made between water use for electricity generation or for environmental and recreational benefits? The authors develop a simple general equilibrium model of a small open economy which is used to derive a cost-benefit rule that can be used to assess projects that divert water from electricity generation to recreational and other uses (or vice versa). The cost-benefit rule is then applied to the specific case of a proposed change at a Swedish hydropower plant. The book provides a manual for the evaluation of river regulations which can easily be replicated in other studies."--Publisher's website

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- Scope of the study -- Important contributions -- Plan of the study -- 2 Some basic tools and concepts -- Utility maximization -- A health production function -- Intertemporal models -- Introducing risk -- Some further comments on risk -- More complex intertemporal models -- Appendix -- 3 Evaluating health changes in a certain world -- Two money measures of a change in health -- On the properties of compensated money measures -- An example: using CV and EV -- Overall versus instantaneous money measures -- A health production function approach -- Using market data to evaluate changes in health -- Appendix -- 4 Money measures in a risky world -- Introducing money measures in a risky world -- A WTP locus -- Evaluating changes in mortality, and the value of a statistical life -- Endogenous risks and altruism -- Changes in wealth and the value of health -- Intertemporal models -- Appendix -- 5 Evaluating health risks: practical methodologies -- The contingent valuation method -- Closed-ended techniques -- A useful interpretation of WTP measures -- CVM studies of health risks -- The human capital approach -- Market-based estimation methods -- The value of a statistical life -- Appendix -- 6 Contingent valuation studies of health care -- Empirical studies of the WTP for health care: a brief review -- A study of high blood pressure -- The results -- Useful formulae for the computation of the mean WTP -- Appendix -- 7 Aggregation -- The social welfare function -- Project evaluations -- Pragmatic views on the aggregation problem -- An illustration: how to assess a treatment -- Altruism -- Altruism in cost-benefit analysis -- Appendix -- 8 Further evaluation issues in a risky world -- The value of information -- A health production function model

Cover -- Half-title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- Welfare economics -- The market economy, market failures, and government failures -- Outline and summary of the rest of this book -- Utility versus welfare -- The Pareto principle -- Pareto optimality and the market economy -- Compensation criteria -- Social welfare functions -- Consumer and producer surplus measures -- Market failures -- Social choice -- Applied welfare economics -- 2 Pareto optimality in a market economy -- 2.1 The Pareto criterion -- 2.2 General equilibrium in a market economy -- 2.3 The Pareto criterion in a market economy -- 2.4 A concluding remark -- 3 The compensation principle and the social welfare function -- 3.1 The compensation principle -- 3.2 The social welfare function -- 3.3 Measurability and comparability -- 3.4 The optimal distribution of welfare and income -- 3.5 Concluding remarks -- 4 Measuring welfare changes -- 4.1 Consumer surplus -- 4.2 Multiple price changes -- 4.3 Aggregation of consumer surplus -- 4.4 Compensating and equivalent variations -- 4.5 Some further results -- 4.6 Welfare measures for firms -- 4.7 Concluding remarks -- 5 Market failures - causes and welfare consequences -- 5.1 Decreasing average costs -- 5.2 Monopoly -- 5.3 Public goods -- 5.4 External effects -- 5.5 Market imbalances -- 5.6 Other sources of market failures -- 5.7 Market failures as a prisoner's dilemma -- 5.8 Concluding remarks -- 6 Public choice -- 6.1 Efficient provision of public goods -- 6.2 The typical taxpayer -- 6.3 Lindahl equilibrium -- 6.4 The median voter equilibrium -- 6.5 What do voters and bureaucrats maximize? -- 7 A 'Smorgasbord' of further topics -- 7.1 Property rights, policy instruments, and the depletion of stratospheric ozone -- 7.2 Coase's theorem -- 7.3 Local public goods -- 7.4 Pareto-efficient and optimal taxation