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Abstract: The article analyzes preconditions, characteristics, processes and outcomes of revolutions through the lens of political elite theory with the aim to study the revolutionary elites formation and development. The article states that the necessary preconditions of revolutions include a severe political crisis, the elite fragmentation and disunity and the predominance of labor force capable of launching an egalitarian revolution in preindustrial societies and an egalitarian revolution in industrial ones. The theory of revolutionary elite formation is illustrated using two revolutionary scenarios. The first scenario changes elite configuration, but leads neither to a complete transformation of elites and their behavioral models nor to the formation of revolutionary elite (England, France, Mexico). The second revolutionary scenario transforms the political elite nature and forms a new revolutionary elite (Russia, Germany, Italy). Findings suggest that revolutionary elite formation results from a combination of multiple sovereignty and an elaborate and guiding ideology. ; Аннотация: В статье рассматриваются предпосылки, черты, процессы и итоги революций в контексте политических элит и исследуется возникновение и развитие правящих элит, сформированных революцией, — революционных элит. Автор утверждает, что обязательными условиями революций являются сильный политический кризис, фрагментация элиты и преобладание рабочей силы, способной осуществить эгалитаристскую революцию в доиндустриальных обществах и антиэгалитаристскую революцию — в индустриальных. Примеры двух революционных сценариев иллюстрируют теорию возникновения революционных элит. Первый сценарий меняет конфигурацию элит, но не приводит к полной трансформации элит, их моделей поведения и возникновению революционной элиты (Англия, Франция, Мексика). Во втором сценарии революция меняет природу политической элиты и формирует новые революционные элиты (Россия, Германия, Италия). По мнению автора, революционные элиты появляются в условиях выраженного множественного суверенитета и наличия убедительной и разработанной идеологии.

1. Avoiding Calamity -- 2. Western Elites and Populists -- 3. Representative Government's Prospects -- 4. Democracy as Rationalization and Panacea -- 5. Anticipations of Parousia in Western Societies -- 6. Intellectual Elites and Realities of Work -- 7. Plutocracy and Demagogy in a Weak State -- 8. The Democracy Ideal Reconsidered.

Introduction -- Elites, non-elites, and politics -- Elites, non-elites, and revolution -- Elites, non-elites, and democracy -- Ultimate and instrumental values in liberal democracy -- The Arab Spring folly -- Political realism in the twenty-first century -- Epilogue : the American preoccupation with non-elites.

Bold political elites and unique forms of social order brought the West to world dominance, but both are weakening dramatically in the contemporary period. The Endangered West makes the case for the continuation of Western power on as wide a global basis as is prudent. Is the survival of Western influence possible, or must we resign ourselves to its eventually being subordinated to more ruthless powers? Higley lays out the main policy lines that successful leadership will have to follow to preserve and strengthen Western societies. These include avoiding futile involvements in the internal problems of non-Western countries and preserving sufficient social order to permit public and private organizations to function. The West will also have to find a way to regularize treatment of the growing number of those who lack employment; invent new forms of useful work for Westerners to perform; inhibit large in-migrations, and discourage population growth. Above all, the West must address the threat of environmental disaster. There is no certain result in the struggle, but such measures will help to prevent a slide into despotism or a lapse into barbarism. Half the battle is to hold on to what the West has and, if possible, extend it. Progress will be made if elites and opinion leaders address societies' problems more competently. If the West's prestige is restored, world tensions may gradually subside, making meeting global problems more possible. --

One aspect of elite theory holds that democratic stability depends heavily on elites trusting each other to keep distributive issues from reaching acute degrees impelling power seizures. This presumes that agreement about the distribution of valued things is seldom deep or wide in large publics. When distributive issues rise to clear public consciousness, the tendency is toward civil strife. Populists assail and undermine elite trust and the management of politics by elites. They thereby weaken an important basis of democratic stability. I argue that the rise of populist leaders to power leads to an erosion of elite trust, which makes distributive issues more acute and threatens the stability of democratic institutions.

Many political thinkers have viewed democratic elitism as closing a democratic road they believe is or should be open-ended. Their view of democratic possibilities reflects the auspicious circumstances of Western societies during the past several centuries and especially since World War II. However, it involves a conflation of liberal and democratic values. I examine why and how this has occurred, and I argue that liberal and democratic values must be more clearly separated in today's dangerous world. In step with Schumpeter, democracy must be regarded as a method or instrumental value that in some but by no means all circumstances promotes the ultimate liberal value of actively individualistic free people.

"Many political thinkers have viewed democratic elitism as closing a democratic road they believe is or should be open-ended. Their view of democratic possibilities reflects the auspicious circumstances of Western societies during the past several centuries and especially since World War II. However, it involves a conflation of liberal and democratic values. I examine why and how this has occurred, and I argue that liberal and democratic values must be more clearly separated in today's dangerous world. In step with Schumpeter, democracy must be regarded as a method or instrumental value that in some but by no means all circumstances promotes the ultimate liberal value of actively individualistic free people." (author's abstract)