Like many other areas of life, humanitarian practice and thinking are being transformed by information and communications technology. Despite this, the growing digitization of humanitarianism has been a relatively unnoticed dimension of global order. Based on more than seven years of data collection and interdisciplinary research, #Help presents a ground-breaking study of digital humanitarianism and its ramifications for international law and politics.
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part Part I Personhood and Personality in International Law -- chapter 1 Jan Klabbers (2005), 'The Concept of Legal Personality' -- chapter 2 Hans Aufricht (1943), 'Personality in International Law' -- part Part II States, Peoples and Cities -- chapter 3 Oleg I. Tiunov (1992-1993), 'The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and Solutions' -- chapter 4 Budislav Vukas (1991), 'States, Peoples and Minorities as Subjects of International Law' -- chapter 5 Yishai Blank (2005-2006), 'The City and the World' -- part Part III Individuals -- chapter 6 Hersch Lauterpacht (1947), 'The Subjects of the Law of Nations' -- chapter 7 Marek St. Korowicz (1956), 'The Problem of the International Personality of Individuals' -- part Part IV International Organizations -- chapter 8 Clarence Wilfred Jenks (1945), 'The Legal Personality of International Organizations' -- chapter 9C.F. Amerasinghe (1995), 'International Legal Personality Revisited' -- chapter 10 David J. Bederman (1995-1996), 'The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel' -- part Part V Non-humans and Non-state Actors -- chapter 11 Karsten Nowrot (2006), 'Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of Influential Non-state Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities' -- chapter 12 Anthony D'Amato and Sudhir K. Chopra (1991), 'Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life' -- part Part VI Possibilities -- chapter 13 Jens David Ohlin (2005), 'Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?' -- chapter 14 Janne E. Nijman (2007), 'Paul Ricoeur and International Law: Beyond "The End of the Subject". Towards a Reconceptualization of International Legal Personality'.
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Abstract Based in Montevideo, and most recently valued at US$5 billion, the payments platform DLocal enables companies such as Booking.com, Amazon and Uber to transact in local currencies in 29 countries. It specializes in the "emerging economies" of Latin America, the Asia Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa. Among international lawyers, however, Montevideo is best known for another form of international infrastructure. That is the 1933 Montevideo Convention, or at least its first article, standardising the template of modern statehood. At the time, as scholars of international legal history have shown, this amounted to a radical reformatting of the fundamentals of international law, driven by semi-peripheral states, as part of a widespread effort of reconstructive codification after the Great War. Today, DLocal's Montevideo is emblematic of a very different kind of international legal reformatting now underway. A digital logic, and associated circuits of value and aggregations of power, are becoming embedded—even predominant—in many of international law's most routine operations. To shed light on this phenomenon, this lecture revisits each component of the Montevideo Convention's well-known formula for statehood—permanent population; defined territory; government; and the conduct of international relations. Taking efforts of so-called digital humanitarianism as illustrative, it examines how each of these Montevideo properties is being rerouted and recomposed digitally, often in tension with an analog logic characteristic of law. And in the ensuing dislocations sometimes in evidence between analog and digital aspects of international legal work, it identifies some possibilities for collective reworking.
In: Forthcoming in Eyal Benvenisti & Dino Kritsiotis (eds), Cambridge History of International Law (Vol. XII): International Law Since the End of the Cold War (Cambridge University Press)
It is an immense privilege to respond, as discussant, to James Gathii's 2020 Grotius Lecture.1 I have known and admired Professor Gathii and his work for decades. He is one of those people who manages to combine great accomplishment in international legal scholarship and practice with an unswerving commitment to teaching, collegiality, and mentoring. In these, and in other ways, James Gathii walks his talk. And his talk, as you have heard, is challenging.
