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Abstract The 2030 Agenda envisages a world "in which democracy, good governance and the rule of law […] are essential for sustainable development" (Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, 2015, paragraph 9). However, the extent to which democratic practices can help or hinder sustainable development remains contested. I show how the relationship between democracy and environmental sustainability can be illuminated by recent advances in research on policy coherence for sustainable development. I apply a framework developed by Shawoo et al., (2022), to illustrate how (in)coherence between these two objectives is driven by a mix of ideas, institutions and interests. This framework can, in turn, help to identify policy options for strengthening coherence between democratic and environmental aims, spanning pluralisation of integrative frames and discourses, inclusive institutional design and reforms that broaden the range of public interests included in decision-making while restraining undue influence of vested interests.

AbstractThe 2030 Agenda envisages a world "in which democracy, good governance and the rule of law […] are essential for sustainable development" (Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, 2015, paragraph 9). However, the extent to which democratic practices can help or hinder sustainable development remains contested. I show how the relationship between democracy and environmental sustainability can be illuminated by recent advances in research on policy coherence for sustainable development. I apply a framework developed by Shawoo et al., (2022), to illustrate how (in)coherence between these two objectives is driven by a mix of ideas, institutions and interests. This framework can, in turn, help to identify policy options for strengthening coherence between democratic and environmental aims, spanning pluralisation of integrative frames and discourses, inclusive institutional design and reforms that broaden the range of public interests included in decision-making while restraining undue influence of vested interests.

Theories of complex systems can yield valuable insights for understanding the increasingly intricate networks of actors, institutions, and discourses involved in international environmental negotiations. While analysis of regimes and regime complexes has shed light on macro-level structures and relationships in global environmental politics, systemic analysis has gained less traction in making sense of micro-level interactions—such as communicative exchanges among participants—that occur within the sites of negotiation and how those interactions shape (and are shaped by) the broader dynamics of governance systems. This article shows how the conceptual lens of "deliberative ecologies" can bridge these levels of analysis by integrating theories of deliberative systems with ideas from complexity theory and social–ecological systems analysis. Drawing on evidence from United Nations climate change and biodiversity conferences between 2009 and 2018, I show how methods such as discourse analysis and process tracing can help to apply a deliberative ecologies perspective and thereby advance understanding of how discourses and deliberative practices diffuse through negotiating sites and how deliberation interacts with the social–ecological dynamics of those sites.

The 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference highlighted the continuing challenge of reconciling developed and developing countries' divergent perceptions about what a fair global climate agreement could look like. A major task for the field of climate ethics is to present a vision of fairness in climate policy that not only has ethical integrity but is practically feasible. However, to date the field has largely not engaged substantively with perceptions of fairness held by participants and stakeholders in climate negotiations. Some theorists have voiced legitimate concerns that relying unduly on stakeholder perceptions may result in theories of fairness whose horizons are limited by political compromise. I will argue that if we are concerned about theory- building as a means of advancing fairness in climate policy, we must take seriously (if not uncritically accept) existing perceptions of fairness. Empirical analysis of those perceptions may play an important role in clarifying the values at stake for different parties and identifying politically feasible steps towards a more thoroughly fair climate regime. I will illustrate the value of this approach with reference to two principles for determining countries' liability to contribute to international climate finance. First, I argue that divergent views about the role of historical responsibility (ranging between liability for all historical emissions and only prospective liability) could be reconciled in a principled way by limiting liability to emissions that foreseeably and avoidably contribute to climate change. Second, while the current listing of 'developed' (Annex I) and 'developing' (non-Annex 1) countries does not distinguish categories of liability in a way that is sufficiently meaningful in ethical terms, theorists need to take seriously the concerns of developing countries about abandoning such a distinction altogether. A fair and politically feasible division could be reached through incremental steps towards more nuanced and objectively based ...

Recent debates about the concept of planetary boundaries recall longstanding concerns about whether ecological limits are compatible with ecological democracy. The planetary boundaries framework (originally set out in Rockstrom et al., 2009a, 2009b) defines values for key Earth-system processes such as climate change and biodiversity that aim to maintain a safe distance from thresholds or levels that could endanger human wellbeing. Despite having a significant impact in policy debates, the framework has been criticised as implying an expert-driven approach to governing global environmental risks that lacks democratic legitimacy. Drawing on research on deliberative democracy and the role of science in democratic societies, we argue that planetary boundaries can be interpreted in ways that remain consistent with democratic decision-making. We show how an iterative, dialogical process to formulate planetary boundaries and negotiate planetary targets could form the basis for a democratically legitimate division of labour among experts, citizens and policy-makers in evaluating and responding to Earth-system risks. Crucial to this division of evaluative labour is opening up space for deliberative contestation about the value judgments inherent in collective responses to Earth-system risks, while also safeguarding the ability of experts to issue warnings about what they consider to be unacceptable risks. ; Funding Agencies|Australian Research CouncilAustralian Research Council [FL140100154]; Swedish Research Council Formas (Formas)Swedish Research Council Formas [211-2012-1842]

A range of developing countries and international advocacy organizations have argued that wealthy countries, as a result of their greater historical contribution to human-induced climate change, owe a climate debt to poor countries. Critics of this argument have claimed that it is incoherent or morally objectionable. In this essay we clarify the concept of climate debt and assess its value for conceptualizing responsibilities associated with global climate change and for guiding international climate negotiations. We conclude that the idea of a climate debt can be coherently formulated, and that while some understandings of the idea of climate debt could lead to morally objectionable conclusions, other accounts would not. However, we argue that climate debt nevertheless provides an unhelpful frame for advancing global justice through international climate negotiations-the only existing means of resolving political conflict over the collective action problems posed by human-induced climate change-due to its retrospective and potentially adversarial emphasis, and to problems of measurement.

A range of developing countries and international advocacy organizations have argued that wealthy countries, as a result of their greater historical contribution to human-induced climate change, owe a climate debt to poor countries. Critics of this argument have claimed that it is incoherent or morally objectionable. In this essay we clarify the concept of climate debt and assess its value for conceptualizing responsibilities associated with global climate change and for guiding international climate negotiations. We conclude that the idea of a climate debt can be coherently formulated, and that while some understandings of the idea of climate debt could lead to morally objectionable conclusions, other accounts would not. However, we argue that climate debt nevertheless provides an unhelpful frame for advancing global justice through international climate negotiations-the only existing means of resolving political conflict over the collective action problems posed by human-induced climate change-due to its retrospective and potentially adversarial emphasis, and to problems of measurement.