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Abstract
Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza's solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.

Abstract
Proponents of judicial supremacy argue that the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is authoritative for the two other branches of government, while advocates of judicial review (or departmentalism) argue that authority to interpret the Constitution resides in each branch. Both sides offer historical examples in which their understanding prevailed. How to resolve this impasse? I argue that Hobbes and Spinoza can inform the debate. To do so, I first unpack the terms: what is the difference between judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy? I then show that a renowned legal scholar, Larry Alexander, specifically invokes Hobbes in defense of judicial supremacy. For Alexander, the Supreme Court functions as a Hobbesian sovereign. Spinoza presents a clear alternative to the Hobbesian solution of avoiding a state of nature by concentrating power in a unitary sovereign, namely, via a strategy of diffusing power throughout society. But Spinoza's solution is not yet a formal separation of powers. This conception of power can therefore clarify the assumptions made by advocates of both judicial review or departmentalism and judicial supremacy. I close by considering instances in American history when the application of departmentalist logic did not lead to a Hobbesian state of nature. And what are the lessons for today? I suggest that it is perhaps time to consider an analog to the Canadian/Israeli notwithstanding clause. But rather than adopting verbatim their legislative override, which effectively designates the legislative branch to be supreme, we could require two of the three independent and equal branches to decide contended constitutional questions. Such an American notwithstanding clause would respect the design of our federal government.

I argue that Augustine can inform contemporary republicanism in a way that has not yet been considered: by means of the utility of "overlapping consensus." I first unpack Philip Pettit's theory of republicanism and demonstrate that his work contains a significant "blind-spot," namely, more deliberation is required than Pettit allows to establish "arbitrary" interference in the lives of citizens for the sake of maximizing non-domination. But the deliberative settings leave an opening for domination through rhetoric. It is here that Augustine enters: although both the Confessions and City of God contain multiple striking examples of the use of rhetoric, they also provide evidence of a distrust of rhetoric given its potential for domination. It is only in Book IV of De Doctrina Christiana that Augustine lays out explicitly and theoretically a positive use of rhetoric. I then argue that, to minimize domination in the deliberative settings required to better understand the changing definition of "arbitrary" interference, Pettit may profitably look to Augustine's explicit theoretical conceptualization of rhetoric. I end by pointing out that this does not require accepting Augustine's ontology and metaphysics. Indeed, through an overlapping consensus, agreement may be reached on rhetorical practices that do not contribute to domination.

1. Introduction -- 2. Ashleen Menchaca-Bagnulo, Rome and the Education of Mercy in Augustine's City of God -- 3. Michelle Kundmueller and Jeremy Castle, When a Law is No Law At All: Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Use of Augustine and Aquinas in the Battle Against Segregation -- 4. Jonathan Price and Bede Mullens, O.P., Augustine's "Inner Self" and Identity Politics -- 5. Veronica Roberts Ogle, Cultus Hominum: Political Reflections on Augustine's Theological Anthropology -- 6. Greg Forster, In Rome but Not of It: Augustine between Eusebius and Donatus -- 7. Wei Hua, Augustine, Political Obedience and Chinese House Churches -- 8. Gladden Pappin, Augustine and Gallicanism -- 9. Edmund Waldstein, O.Cist, Spiritual Ends and Temporal Power: An Integralist Reading of The City of God -- 10. Paul Miller, Augustinian Liberalism -- 11. Kody Cooper, Existential Humility and the Critique of Civil Religion in Augustine's Political Theology -- 12. Peter Busch, Augustine's Call to Citizenship -- 13. Mary Keys, Elitism and Secularism, Old and New: Augustine on Humility, Pride, and Philosophy in The City of God VIII-X -- 14. Paul Weithman, Pride in a Time of Crisis -- 15. Michael Lamb, Augustine and Contemporary Political Theory: Toward an Augustinian Republicanism -- 16. Boleslaw Z. Kabala and Caleb Morefield, Speech and Silence: Republican Toleration in Augustine -- 17. Elżbieta Ciżewska-Martyńska, Augustine and Polish Republicans on the Fragility of Liberty: Questions for Today -- 18. Matthew Hallgarth, Augustine's Principled Realism -- 19. Douglas Kries, Augustine and the Flexibility of True Justice -- 20. Eric Gregory, Beyond Critique: Just War as Theological Political Theology -- 21. Nathan Pinkoski, "Love, but Be Careful What You Love": Arendt's Augustinian Fragments on Thinking -- 22. Daniel Strand, Augustine's Privation, Arendt's Banality -- 23. Conclusions.