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The main body of this Element, about Kant's theory of conscience, is divided into two sections. The first focuses on exegesis of Kant's ethics. One of the overarching theses of this section of the Element is that, although many of Kant's claims about conscience are prima facie inconsistent, a close examination of context generally can dissolve apparent contradictions. The second section of the Element focuses on philosophical issues in Kantian ethics. One of the overarching theses of this section of the Element is that many positions traditionally associated with Kantian ethics, including the denial of moral luck, the nonaccidental rightness condition, and the guise of the objectively good, are at variance with Kant's ethics.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first and second, I examine Sartorio's account of the causal structure of the famous Thirsty Traveler thought experiment. I argue that this account does not withstand critical scrutiny. In the third, I turn to a novel kind of moral luck that Sartorio uses the Thirsty Traveler to expose. I expand the scope of my argument to look also at other recently proposed categories of moral luck. I argue that these proposals are overhasty

In this article I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant's
Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks levelled by Faviola
Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven
Nyholm. After a short introduction, the article is divided into four main
sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations,
the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction
Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation.
In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, Kleingeld and Nyholm:
these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely,
but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I
take a detailed look at Furner's work, work in which he seeks to revise
(rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his
more modest aims, Furner's revision is also ill-founded.