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The article conducts a comparative study between Ricœur's and Rawls' thought on justice. Whereas Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between the just and the good, Rawls is concerned with the ideal conditions under which a universal consensus on the principles of justice may be reached. Ricœur gives much importance to reading Rawls. He offers many commentaries, especially on Rawls's major contribution, A Theory of Justice. This chapter focuses on such comments and on the relating paradoxical interpretation of Rawls's approach to justice Ricœur provides. First, this chapter suggests that, with his interpretation of Rawls's major contribution, Ricœur contributes to put the light on the conflicts between the just and the good. These conflicts are the key elements of what may be referred to as the aporia of the just, which consists in the contradictory requirements coming from the just considered as a virtue of either institutions or individuals. Second, this chapter shows that whereas the aporia is a major problem in Rawls' approach to justice, it is at the core of the dialectic dynamic Ricœur sees within moral life. In his work, the aporia leads to what we call the three paradoxes of justice, which are the paradoxes with legal, distributive and political justice. Considering such paradoxes, Ricœur takes the ethics of practical wisdom as a necessary recourse. The latter provides fair decision makers with the resources needed for the aporia to be, if not resolved, at least eased.

The article conducts a comparative study between Ricœur's and Rawls' thought on justice. Whereas Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between the just and the good, Rawls is concerned with the ideal conditions under which a universal consensus on the principles of justice may be reached. Ricœur gives much importance to reading Rawls. He offers many commentaries, especially on Rawls's major contribution, A Theory of Justice. This chapter focuses on such comments and on the relating paradoxical interpretation of Rawls's approach to justice Ricœur provides. First, this chapter suggests that, with his interpretation of Rawls's major contribution, Ricœur contributes to put the light on the conflicts between the just and the good. These conflicts are the key elements of what may be referred to as the aporia of the just, which consists in the contradictory requirements coming from the just considered as a virtue of either institutions or individuals. Second, this chapter shows that whereas the aporia is a major problem in Rawls' approach to justice, it is at the core of the dialectic dynamic Ricœur sees within moral life. In his work, the aporia leads to what we call the three paradoxes of justice, which are the paradoxes with legal, distributive and political justice. Considering such paradoxes, Ricœur takes the ethics of practical wisdom as a necessary recourse. The latter provides fair decision makers with the resources needed for the aporia to be, if not resolved, at least eased.

Résumé L'article soutient que l'impartialité conçue comme ignorance est un premier pas, nécessaire mais insuffisant, vers la justice sociale. Il montre la pertinence de placer l'évaluateur social sous un voile d'ignorance : ses jugements sont alors soumis au principe moral d'universalisation, lequel en garantit l'impartialité. Mais la modélisation de l'impartialité diffère selon que l'on interprète de manière kantienne ou utilitariste le principe sous-jacent d'universalisation. L'article compare le modèle utilitariste de l'observateur impartial de Harsanyi au modèle kantien de l'observateur ignorant de Gajdos et Kandil. Il défend ce dernier, lequel prouve que, contrairement à ce que prétendait Rawls, le critère de choix sous voile d'ignorance n'est pas univoque.

Résumé Sen [2006] distingue deux approches de la justice sociale. L'approche transcendantale s'intéresse aux caractéristiques d'une société juste. L'approche comparative s'intéresse aux classements d'états sociaux alternatifs. Pour Sen, ces deux approches sont exclusives l'une de l'autre. Cet article défend le point de vue contraire. L'approche transcendantale (ou idéale) est nécessaire mais doit être complétée par une analyse comparative. Réciproquement, l'approche comparative est nécessaire mais a besoin d'un ancrage transcendantal. Nous appelons synthétique la perspective qui consiste à mettre en valeur les liens de complémentarité entre ces deux approches. Cette perspective permet d'interroger les fondements éthiques de l'évaluation sociale.

Pour rendre compte du comportement rationnel d'ordre éthique, Harsanyi reprend la figure du spectateur impartial de Smith. Or, des différences significatives apparaissent, entre les deux auteurs, concernant le traitement du jugement moral. Chez Harsanyi, il s'agit d'un jugement déterminant qui part d'une connaissance mathématique des préférences morales et évalue quantitativement les conséquences des actions. Chez Smith, le jugement réfléchissant du spectateur impartial opère de manière approximative, par analogie et induction. Derrière les deux formes de jugement, se confrontent deux modèles d'action et deux conceptions différentes des rapports entre les actes économiques et la morale.